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This research focuses on the Emory and Obed Watersheds in the Cumberland Plateau in 
Central Tennessee and the Lower Hatchie River Watershed in West Tennessee. A framework 
based on market and nonmarket valuation techniques was used to empirically estimate 
economic values for environmental amenities and negative externalities in these areas. The 
specific techniques employed include a variation of hedonic prioing and discrete choice 
conjoint analysis (i.e., choice modeling), in addition to geographic information systems (GIS) 
and remote sensing. Microeconomic models of agent behavior, including random utility theory 
and profit maximization, provide the principal theoretical foundation linking valuation 
techniques and econometric models. The generalized method of moments estimator for a first­
order spatial autoregressive function and mixed logit models are the principal econometric 
methods applied within the framework. 
The dissertation is subdivided into three separate chapters written in a manuscript format. 
The first chapter provides the necessary theoretical and mathematical conditions that must be 
satisfied in order for a forest amenity enhancement program to be implemented. Such a 
program is possible and would yield an efficient outcome under three conditions: (1) 
contributors are willing to pay an amount that maximizes the utility they derive from forest 
amenities; ( 2) an intermediary party sets a compensation price based on contributor aggregate 
willingness to pay such that the social value of the program is maximized; and (3) a 
participating landowner maximizes profit given this incentive. The second chapter evaluates 
the effect of forest land cover and information about future land use change on respondent 
preferences and willingness to pay for alternative hypothetical forest amenity enhancement 
options. Land use change information and the amount of forest land cover significantly 
influenced respondent preferences, choices, and stated willingness to pay. Hicksian welfare 
iii 
estimates for proposed enhancement options ranged from $57.42 to $25.53, depending on the 
policy specification, information level, and econometric model. The third chapter presents 
economic values for negative externalities associated with channelization that affect the 
productivity and overall market value of forested wetlands. Results of robust, generalized 
moments estimation of a double logarithmic first-order spatial autoregressive error model 
(inverse distance weights with spatial dependence up to 1500m) indicate that the implicit cost 
of damages to forested wetlands caused by channelization equaled -$5,438 ha·1• 
Collectively, the results of this dissertation provide economic measures of the damages to 
and benefits of environmental assets, help private landowners and policy makers identify the 
amenity attributes preferred by the public, and improve the management of natural resources. 
iv 
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Part 1 
Introduction and Overview 
1 
1. Introduction 
The absence of a property rights structure for environmental amenities such as clean air, 
clean water, and landscape aesthetics precludes the application of traditional market 
mechanisms for assigning monetary values to improvements in or damages to these amenities. 
However, environmental amenities influence the preferences and decisions of consumers in 
the market. Similarly, the market actions of consumers affect, both positively and negatively, 
the quality and quantity of environmental amenities. Thus, the problem exists to quantify the 
external effects of amenities on consumer behavior and the effects of consumers on the 
environment in order to develop policies that will facilitate progress toward a sustainable level 
of environmental quality. 
The discipline of environmental valuation (EV), or more generally, natural resource and 
environmental economics, has evolved to link activity in the economy to the functioning of the 
environment. This link is based on models adapted from microeconomic theory of agent 
behavior including utility and profit maximization. While casual observation would imply a 
clear connection between the environment and the economy, with the former serving as a 
primary source of raw materials and waste disposal for the latter, efforts to connect the two 
have proven to be complicated and suspect (Hausman 1993). However, in cases of natural 
resource damage assessment (NRDA) or national economic development (NED) benefits the 
link between the environment and the economy must be made and quantified. Moreover, for 
more general policy ev�luation or in the early stages of policy formation, information 
concerning the relationship between the environment and the economy can provide useful 
insight into potential tradeoffs or consequences of alternative actions. Thus, environmental 
valuation may be seen as unavoidable for some while a significant contribution to the 
improvement of the environment, and correspondingly, society, for others. 
2 
Environmental valuation researchers have developed and refined specific techniques over 
several decades to quantify this relationship in economic terms, i.e., prices. These techniques 
rely on the preference structure of the consumer and utilize either stated (direct) or revealed 
(indirect) methods to equate the consumer's held preferences into willingness to pay (WTP) 
estimates. In stated preference (SP) methods, researchers apply a survey format to establish a 
hypothetical market for environmental goods and services (EGS): Market participants are 
directly questioned about their preferences for EGS and willingness to pay to secure 
improvements in them. Standard administration formats for SP surveys, or constructed 
markets, include telephone, mail, and in-person interviews. Contingent valuation (CV) and 
conjoint analysis (CJ) are two principal methodologies. Both CV and CJ have been accepted 
by the Federal government as means of assessing the nonmarket values, in particular, nonuse 
values, in cases of natural resource damages (Arrow et al. 1993). 
Stated preference methods have been criticized on a number of grounds but primarily for 
the lack of realism in the constructed market and hypothetical nature of willingness to pay 
(Diamond and Hausman 1994). The criticism stems from market participants expressing only 
intended behavior through choices and stated WTP that is in turn contingent upon hypothetical 
scenarios specified by the researcher. For example, a researcher may ask the respondent to 
choose their most preferred stream restoration plan from a set of proposed plans and then how 
much they would be willing to pay to have the plan enacted. The argument is that the 
hypothetical context in which WTP is solicited should yield hypothetical monetary values for 
EGS. Accordingly, the question is raised: Should hypothetical values be applied in lawsuits 
where significant fines are assessed to the damager or for evaluating alternative policies that 
could have significant welfare implications? 
3 
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Revealed preference (RP) methods offer an alternative to the hypothetical data generating 
process of SP methods by inferring prices for EGS through analysis of consumer behavior for 
related market goods. Hedonic pricing and the travel cost method are two principal techniques. 
In the case of hedonic pricing, economic values for EGS are derived by econometrically 
decomposing the market price of a good (typically housing) into prices for individual 
attributes defining the good. Assuming environmental conditions are an element of this 
attribute set, an economic value can be similarly assigned to varying levels of these 
conditions. The travel cost method relies on a comparable methodology in that the expenditure 
and number of trips outdoor recreationists incur during pursuit of their activities can be 
incorporated into econometric models to derive the economic value of changes in 
environmental conditions at visited sites. Complications with RP methods include an indirect 
relationship between EGS and the market good, large data sets (given the predominantly cross 
sectional nature of RP studies), omitted variable bias, multiple purpose trips, substitute sites, 
and multicollinearity, to name a few. 
Given the assumptions and econometric difficulties associated with revealed and stated 
preference approaches, the opportunity cost method (OCM) presents a viable alternative for 
environmental valuation. The OCM is used to value environmental goods and services by 
computing the economic value of opportunity costs, in terms of forgone market benefits, 
associated with environmental protection. This method may be preferred over the 
aforementioned alternatives because derived economic values for EGS are based on a direct 
I 
relationship to market goods. For example, the monetary value of a wetland being considered 
for a residential subdivision would be calculated as the net present value of the revenue stream 
associated with the development. Mathematically, 
T 




where P denotes market price, B denotes net monetary benefits of development D, p is the 
discount rate equal to (l+�r1, with� denoting rate of time preference, t indexes time, and OC 
represents opportunity costs. This calculation can be performed with relative ease, especially 
in comparison to SP and RP methods, since market data are readily available. However, a 
tradeoff of the simplistic mathematical (and data) structure of OCM arises if we interpret 
equation [1] as stating that the market price of a wetland must be at least as great as forgone 
market benefits (i.e., opportunity costs) of development. This interpretation implies the OCM 
can only yield relative magnitudes, as opposed to specific values. In certain circumstances, 
such as preliminary policy evaluation, the limitations of OCM may not be of consequence and 
derived values can provide useful information. However, for NRDA and NED cases, specific 
values for EGS are necessary and thus computed using stated or revealed preference methods. 
I do not pursue further the application of OCM but consider a comparison of estimates derived 
with this methodology and those computed in this dissertation to constitute a worthwhile 
study. 
To that end, this dissertation applies both revealed and stated preference techniques for the 
valuation of environmental quality in two Tennessee watersheds. In concert with these 
applications, geographic information systems (GIS) are used to analyze spatial factors 
affecting individual preferences and willingness to pay for EGS. Geographic information 
systems (GIS) and remotely sensed data (e.g., satellite images of vegetative ground cover) are 
quickly becoming cornerstones in environmental and natural resource economic research 
(Bateman et al. 2002). These tools enable researchers to model the spatial complexities 
involved in environmental issues, for example, the scale of an oil spill in a natural resource 
damage assessment case or spatial autocorrelation in hedonic price studies (Anselin 2001). 
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Moreover, GIS and remote sensing may provide for more efficient means of benefit transfer 
(e.g., transferring benefits from one study area to another based on groupings of pixels with 
similar spectral reflectance properties). GIS and remote sensing, though, may contribute the 
most by focusing research (e.g., in a survey study, GIS can be used to identify upstream and 
downstream residents and then model their responses as a function of location) and reducing 
the time involved with planning, acquiring, and analyzing spatial and non-spatial data. As time 
progresses, more of the geographic information necessary for environmental and natural 
resource economic research will become available and at a lower cost. Increased access to 
higher quality spatial data will prove to yield significant improvements in EV in the future. 
The research for this dissertation will be using the latest remotely sensed imagery (LandSat 7 
ETM+ ), the most advanced spatial imaging and analysis software (ArcGIS and Imagine), and 
readily available geographic data (e.g., streets and streams). 
The principal purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that environmental valuation 
techniques, geographic information systems, and remote sensing can serve a role in the 
sustainable use of forests, streams, and natural landscapes of Tennessee. These natural 
resources generate multiple public benefits but the supply is held predominantly by private 
landowners; approximately 89 percent of all forested land in Tennessee is privately owned 
(Schweitzer 2000). With private landowners holding a disproportionate share of forestland, the 
public must work with these landowners to increase the supply of environmental benefits. 
However, private landowners are under no obligation to undertake management activities to 
improve the supply or refuse bids to convert the land to another use. Government programs 
designed to compensate willing (or participating) landowners for activity costs are limited, in 
both personnel and funds. Thus, similar to the problem given in the introductory paragraph, 
the challenge is to design a system to assess the public's willingness to pay, extract such 
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payments (either through voluntary contributions to a non-profit organization or tax 
increases), and then compensate landowners for incurred expenditures related to resource 
enhancing management activities. Such a framework would protect and improve the supply of 
natural resources, and in particular, environmental amenities such as wildlife habitat, for 
current and future generations. 
I present this framework in Part 2 and in Part 3 discuss the results of a stated preference, 
choice modeling based constructed market applied in the evaluation of willingness to pay, and 
more generally, support for improving the current stock of forest amenities. Comparing 
principal results between the two chapters, I find that people are willing to pay (approximately 
$25) but that landowners are not willing to manage. This discrepancy between supply and 
demand represents a significant hurdle that will require extensive landowner education to 
overcome. 
In contrast to the case presented above where landowners are encouraged to improve 
public benefits, landowners can produce a portion of the negative externalities that impact 
forests, streams, and natural landscapes. For example, harvesting activities conducted too 
close to a stream can lead to increases in stream temperature, which has consequences for 
stream biodiversity and productivity, as well as reductions in water quality due to increased 
sediment from erosion. Additionally, management activities dominated by poor harvesting 
practices (e.g., high grading) will eventually result in a forest comprised of overstory and 
understory species that contribute little to society both monetarily and non-monetarily. It is 
clear from the examples that landowners' activities can reduce resource quality and public 
benefits. In these cases, environmental valuation provides unique information that can help 
landowners, non-landowners, and policy makers collectively work together to improve 
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management practices and progress toward environmental sustainability within the context of 
further economic growth and development. 
Part 4 presents one such case of lost public benefits due to past agricultural, forestry, and 
channelization activities. The combination of these activities has resulted in excessive 
sedimentation in streams of the Lower Hatchie River Watershed, which has in turn 
substantially reduced forest value, biological productivity, biodiversity, and hydrological 
functioning. In this case, a revealed preference method was applied to compute economic 
values for damages associated directly with channelization and indirectly, damages from 
excessive sedimentation. I present the results, or prices, as representing a new source of 
information that would enable policy makers to evaluate in equivalent economic terms costs 
associated with the current level of damage and benefits of alternative restoration projects. 
Supplemental to valuing benefits and costs for policy and management evaluation, 
environmental valuation plays a role in private resource conservation decisions and land use 
planning in Tennessee. Resource conservation organizations may rely on economic valuation 
of environmental assets to justify land purchases or projects that would otherwise not be 
feasible when evaluated on market values. For example, a large forested tract near an urban 
area will be valued for its potential developable use but the true value may be much greater as 
the tract provides wildlife habitat, scenic beauty, and erosion control. Environmental valuation 
techniques provide the tools an organization needs to derive public welfare estimates that 
could then be combined with market values to more accurately evaluate the project. Similarly, 
in a land use planning context, EV techniques provide planners the capability to gather 
information on public preferences for alternative proposals while simultaneously determining 
the social welfare (in economic terms) of each alternative. Accordingly, EV can lead to more 
comprehensive project analysis and ultimately, a more efficient allocation of land among 
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preservation, conservation, and development objectives. This application of EV may assume 
an even more important role in the future as land use continues to change from natural 
(agricultural, forest, and open space) to developed (transportation networks, urban, and 
industrial). 
2. Objectives 
The goal of this research was to develop prices for externalities and public goods on both 
public and private lands using forest valuation, environmental valuation, and spatial data 
analysis techniques. Principal methods included a variation of hedonic pricing, choice 
modeling, and geographic information systems (GIS). Study areas included the Emory and 
Obed Watersheds on the Cumberland Plateau in Central Tennessee and the Lower Hatchie 
River Watershed in West Tennessee. Specific objectives for this research include the 
following: 
1.) Establish theoretical and mathematical conditions for aligning the behavior of people 
willing to contribute to a program designed to improve the supply of forest amenities, 
landowners who control the available supply, and a third party non-profit organization who 
serves as a bridge between contributors and landowners. 
2.) Develop a multi-class land cover classification of the Emory-Obed watershed using 
remotely sensed imagery, geographic information systems, and field data. 
3.) Apply choice modeling in Cumberland and Morgan counties to assess willingness to pay 
for a program designed to provide landowners compensation in exchange for managing their 
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land for improved non-timber forest benefits. Additionally, test whether different 
specifications of the choice scenario and the amount (m2) of forest cover within a 1OOm radius 
of each respondent influence choice and willingness to pay. 
4.) Construct a spatial theoretic, implicit valuation model to monetize impacts of specific 
ecological and anthropogenic factors on forest productivity in the bottomland hardwood 
forests along the Hatchie River and tributaries of the Hatchie. 
3. Study Area Descriptions 
The study areas for this research include the Lower Hatchie River Watershed and the 
Emory-Obed Watershed. These two watersheds are spatially and ecologically distinct yet 
share a common lack of biological and economic information. For this reason and due to 
concerns over environmental quality, they were selected for analysis. Specific reasons 
underlying selection of each watershed as well as short area descriptions are provided below. 
The Lower Hatchie River Watershed (LHRW) (HUC 08010208) is located in West 
Tennessee and includes the counties of Chester, Lauderdale, Madison, Hardeman, Fayette, 
Haywood, and Tipton. The watershed comprises approximately 3,820 square km, 56,994 ha of 
which is bottomland hardwood forest (BLH), and contains the State designated Scenic Hatchie 
River (EPA 2004). The Hatchie River is one of the longest unchannelized rivers remaining in 
the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Valley and has been named one of the "Last Great Places" by 
I 
the Nature Conservancy. One of the unique features of the Hatchie is that it flows northward, 




The LHRW is marked by flat topography, seasonal and permanent flooding, and soils 
dominated by fine wind-blown soil (loess). These natural features are significant factors in the 
ability of the watershed to provide highly productive wildlife habitat, biodiversity, landscape 
aesthetics, timber production, and opportunities for recreation. Channelization, levee 
construction, excessive sedimentation, and subsequently, BLH conversion, are the primary 
factors affecting the stability of the LHRW. Channelization is an anthropogenic practice 
intended to focus stream and river reaches to narrow channels in order to increase the amount 
of allowable forest and agricultural land. Levee construction can occur during channelization 
activities and is another means of decreasing the area drained by a watercourse. The excessive 
amount of sediment being deposited in tributaries of the Hatchie River and in the river itself is 
due primarily to upland agricultural and forestry activities but is magnified by the highly 
erodible loess. The excessive sedimentation in the LHRW has resulted in the formation of 
valley plugs and shoals, degraded fish habitat, diminished floodplain functioning, and 
increased mortality of BLH (from prolonged flooding and root suffocation). Conversion of 
BLH refers more to the loss of BLH from excessive sedimentation than to urban development 
pressures. The collective detrimental impacts of channelization, levee construction, and 
excessive sedimentation on floodplains and bottomland hardwood forests in the LHRW 
include diminished capabilities to assimilate and store nutrients and pollutants, recharge 
aquifers, and abate floods. Furthermore, significant reductions in biological productivity, 
ecological stability, biodiversity, and forest value have been noted (see Part 4). 
Research was conducted in the upper section of the Lower Hatchie River Watershed to 
price the negative effects of excessive sedimentation and channelization on the bottomland 
hardwood ecosystem. The LHRW was selected for its unique and ecologically diverse 
bottomland hardwood ecosystem, complex of nonindustrial private landowners and objectives, 
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supply of productive wildlife habitat, significance in water provision and quality maintenance, 
and role in the central and western Tennessee economies. Each of these reasons underscores 
the prominence of the LHRW in both private and public goods provision. 
The Emory/Obed Watershed (EOW) (HUC 06010208) is located in East Tennessee and 
includes the counties of Bledsoe, Cumberland, Fentress, Morgan, and Roane. The EOW drains 
2,258 square km with approximately 92% of the area located in Cumberland and Morgan 
Counties (EPA 2004). The federally designated Natural Wild and Scenic Emory and Obed 
Rivers flow through the EOW. These rivers provide multiple recreational opportunities, in 
particular, whitewater paddling and rock climbing. The economy in the EOW is 
predominantly dependent on manufacturing and retail trade with supplementary income from 
outdoor recreation-based activities (Census Bureau 1997). Second home construction, retiree 
emigration, and parcelization are the primary threats to the viability of the ecosystem in the 
EOW. This research intends to provide results that will help land managers, land use planners, 
residents, and private landowners realize the full economic value of the natural resources in 
the EOW and incorporate that information into improved natural resource and economic 
development. 
4. Methods Review 
The following brief reviews of the hedonic price method and discrete choice conjoint 
analysis, or choice modeling, serve as precursors to more detailed examinations in later 
I 
chapters. The first review covers the revealed preference method of hedonic pricing and the 
second review concerns the stated preference method choice modeling. 
12 
.. 
4.1. Hedonic Price Method 
The purpose of this review is to set the stage for extending the hedonic price method 
(HPM) to the theory and estimation procedures of spatial econometrics. Part 4 provides an 
extensive review of spatial econometrics as applied to forested wetland valuation, yet requires 
a basic understanding of hedonic pricing. 
The theoretical model most widely applied in hedonic studies was developed by Rosen 
(1974) and Freeman (1993) and is based on Lancaster's (1966) theory that a consumer's 
preferences are dependent on the characteristics of the goods, not j ust the goods themselves. 
The characteristics theory of Lancaster provides the essence of HPM in that the economic 
value of a non-priced attribute defining a market good can be uncovered through 
decomposition of the good's market price. The term decomposition implies a statistical 
procedure of regression analysis. Thus, the HPM provides a construct consistent with 
economic theory and well-known statistical methods. For this reason, it has received 
considerable attention in the environmental valuation literature. 
There are essentially two stages in estimation of the hedonic price method, with the first 
stage involving derivation of marginal implicit prices for goods attributes and the second 
calculating welfare estimates based on first stage estimates. For the purpose of the review, and 
dissertation, I will only discuss the first stage. The following discussion is based on Rosen 
(1974) and Freeman (1993). 
The first stage of the hedonic price method identifies the market price of good m as a 
function of its characteristics: 
m= l , . .. ,r [2] 
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where P is market price, Z is an n x k vector of attributes describing the good, and r is the total 
number of goods under evaluation. Equation [2] is referred to as the hedonic price function. If 
the good is taken to be a house, then equation [2] can be written as: 
P=p(L, S, N, Q) [3] 
where P is an n x 1 vector of transaction prices, L is an n x 1 vector of lot sizes, S is an n x k 
vector of structural characteristics (e. g. , number of rooms and age), N is an n x k vector of 
neighborhood characteristics (e. g. , location to a maj or thoroughfare and quality of schools), 
and Q is an n x k vector of environmental amenities. 
The link between market prices for homes, attributes describing each home, and attribute 
prices is the direct utility function of individual homebuyers. In this framework, individual i 
purchases the mth home from all other homes -m because that particular home contains the 
optimal mix of attributes. That is, the combination of attributes provides the greatest utility to 
individual i, given budgetary constraints. We can form ally define this relationship with the 
following: 
s.t. Y; =X+ 8(Zm) [4] 
where U denotes direct utility, X denotes a composite commodity with price normalized to 
one, Z denotes attributes of the home, Y is income, and 8 denotes price of elements in Z. 
Equation [4] states that individual} will choose levels of X and Z such that constrained utility 
will be maximized. Violation of utility maximization behavior in the housing market would 
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undermine the use of hedonic pricing for environmental valuation and imply that consumers 
are irrational decision makers. An additional assumption for equation [4] holds that consumer 
preferences for housing bundles are weakly separable, which allows the researcher to 
investigate the demand for housing characteristics independent of the prices of other goods 
(Freeman 1993, p. 371). 
Combining equations [3] and [4] allows us to derive a mathelflatical expression for the 
marginal implicit price of any element in Z. For the case of an environmental amenity q in 
vector Q, the implicit price is calculated by partially differentiating the hedonic price function 
with respect to q and setting the solution equal to the ratio of levels q* and X* that maximize 
the Lagrangian of equation [ 4]: 
(8U I 8q*) I (8U I 8X*) = 8P I 8q* [5] 
Equation [5] represents the first order condition for the choice of the environmental amenity. 
The left hand side corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution between the amenity and 
the composite commodity, or equivalently, the marginal willingness to pay for the 
environmental amenity. The partial derivative (right hand side of equation [5]) yields the 
marginal implicit price for the good, or the additional amount that must be paid by an 
individual to move to another home with more of the environmental amenity, all other things 
being equal (Freeman 1993). Given a linear functional form of the hedonic price function 
.(equation [3]) 
P=a+ftZ+ & c-N(O, d) [6] 
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where P is house sale price, f3 is a conformable vector of weights for housing attributes, and & 
is a random error term, the marginal implicit price is simply the coefficient /3q from ordinary 
least squares estimation. 
Economic theory does not suggest a specific functional form for the hedonic price function 
and as a result, this issue has received considerable attention in the literature. Rosen (1974, p. 
37) states that the linear form is not consistent with economic theory since it implies perfect 
substitution between housing attributes (he refers to this as costless repacking), thus it should 
not be applied in empirical analysis. Based on this assertion, various nonlinear functional 
forms have been applied and include quadratic, semi-logarithmic, double-logarithmic, and 
Box-Cox transformations (Box and Cox 1964). The general conclusion from these 
applications has been that the choice of the appropriate representation of the hedonic price 
function should be determined on a case by case basis with emphasis on the form that provides 
the best fit of the data (Cassel and Mendelsohn 1985, Halstead et al. 1997). Functional form 
specification is an important issue in hedonic studies because application of an incorrect form 
can yield errors in the implicit prices (Cropper et al. 1988) and significantly affect the 
conclusions (Halvorsen and Pollakowski 1981 ). We test several functional forms in the 
analysis in Part 4 to evaluate potential differences. 
4.2. Choice Modeling 
Discrete choice conjoint analysis or choice modeling (CM) is a multiattribute stated 
preference method for determining the economic value of environmental goods and services. 
Choice modeling is one of four specific types of conjoint analysis, which is a survey based 
methodology developed by mathematical psychologists for the marketing profession in the 
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1960's (Farber and Griner 2000). Ratings, rankings, and graded pair comparisons comprise the 
other three elicitation formats (Louviere 1988). 
Generally, in a CM survey the participant is asked to evaluate simultaneously several 
policy options that will provide a good or service at varying quality levels. The participant 
then chooses the option that contains the levels she most prefers. The multiple attribute format 
of CM allows the researcher to determine the relative worth of each fittribute quality level and 
establish a preference structure for survey participants. From this structure, preference 
orderings are determ ined (e. g. , respondents prefer policy option A to option B and C), 
willingness to pay measures estimated, and changes in welfare calculated. Recently, 
environmental economists have applied CM for these reasons and because it allows for the 
evaluation of tradeoffs (through the inclusion of substitutes), more detailed presentation of the 
good, reduced framing bias, and wider applicability of the results compared to contingent 
valuation (Hanley et al. 1998). 
Similar to contingent valuation (CV), though, choice modeling is a utility based method in 
that the option chosen by the individual is revealed preferred to all other feasible options. 
Additionally, for both methods standard utility theory is extended to allow for unobservable 
elements not captured in the survey instrument that influence the survey participant's choice. 
In order to account for these elements, utility includes an error term that varies randomly 
across survey participants. This form ulation of the basic microeconomic model of utility 
maximization is referred to as random utility theory (RUT) and is based on the work of Luce 
(1959) and McFadden (1974). Following RUT, the utility function applied in hedonic pricing 
for participant i (equation [ 4]) can be separated into a linear combination of systematic ( V) and 
random (e) components: 
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[7] 
where Z is a vector of attributes of the J(h option in the choice set, R is a vector of individual 
characteristics, X is a vector of observed option and individual attributes, p a conformable 
vector of parameters or part-worths, and a stochastic term e. Equation [7] states that survey 
participant i derives latent, or unobservable, utility U* from option k in the set of all options K 
and that the systematic component is the only part that can be measured by the researcher. A 
linear functional form is typically specified for the systematic term. 
Since there are multiple options in K the participant can choose, the researcher is interested 
in uncovering elements in Rand Z that influence the participant's choice of a particular option 
k. Thus, a probability function based on equation [7] for explaining choice of option k over h 
can be constructed: 
Pr;(k = 1 I W) = Pr;{X,P; + e;k > X,P; + e;h} V k �handk,h e K [8] 
or by simply rearranging the expression: 
Pr;(k = 1 I W) = Pr;{X,JJ; - X,P; > e;h - e;k} [9] 
where W is an aggregate term denoting measured and unmeasured factors. Equations [8] and 
[9] state that option k will be chosen over some other option h if latent utility survey 
participant i derives from k exceeds that from h. Equation [9] gives rise to a cumulative 
distribution function which can be econometrically modeled given certain distributional 
assumptions on e. As a note, since utility U* is unobservable the mean and variance of e are 
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not identified and the researcher must impose structure or a specific distribution on e. If the 
error terms are assumed to have a Weibull distribution (i.e., identically and independently 
distributed with a Type I extreme value distribution), the probability of choosing option k over 
his given by the conditional logit model (McFadden 1974): 
K 
Pr;(k= 11 W) = Pr;{ U;k* > U;h*} = exp(X,JJ;) I L [exp(Xsfl;)] [10 ] 
s=l 
The conditional logit model is an appropriate econometric representation of survey 
participant choices in discrete choice conjoint analysis because it models choice probabilities 
as a function of the attributes and levels in the selected option as well as those in the options 
not selected.1 However, the conditional logit model assumes that the probability of choosing k 
is invariant to the addition or exclusion of other options from K. This assumption is referred to 
as the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives or IIA. Since this assumption may be 
violated in our analyses and due to the modeling of participant choice over multiple choice 
occasions (thus giving rise to a panel data set), mixed logit models will also be estimated? 
The conditional logit model is estimated with maximum likelihood methods and the 
resulting coefficients can be used to estimate the welfare gain or loss associated with 
decreases or increases in certain elements of X. Accordingly, the compensating variation ( CV) 
1 Equation [1 0] may be referred to as the multinomial logit model since vector X includes individual 
specific attributes that do not vary across choices. These attributes are included in econometric 
estimation of equation [10] by interacting each with an alternative specific constant. 
2 Mixed logit models (Train 2003) account for correlation in the unobservable components of 
choice, i.e., E[e;t. e!i] * 0, across individuals and choice occasions. Thus, the IIA assumption is not 
required in mixed logit models. Additionally, mixed logit models explicitly incorporate individual 
effects that persist over time (i.e., over choice sets) whereas multinomial or conditional logit models are 
intended for cross-sectional data. 
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welfare estimate can be computed for an improvement in environmental quality from q to q' 
(q' > q): 
n n K 
CV = 1/fip* tn[ L exp(XkOpi) I L L exp(Xkpi) J 
i= I i= I k= I 
[11] 
where option k0 captures the status quo level q, k' captures the improvement q', fip is the 
maximum likelihood coefficient for the payment to secure q', p is a vector of estimated 
parameters (except for fip), i indexes survey participants (i = l , . . .  ,n), and CV measures the 
change in the individual's income (holding utility constant) that would leave her as well off at 
the status quo level k0 as she would be at the higher level k� Thus, through the application of 
choice modeling and the responses of individuals to options presented in the survey, an 
economic value ( CV) can be placed on improved environmental quality q'. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into three separate parts written as 
publishable manuscripts and a concluding part that summ arizes and links all of the results. The 
second part is purely theoretical and serves as a foundation for the applied analysis in Part 3. 
The third chapter applies the stated preference technique choice modeling to the valuation of 
forest amenities and evaluates spatial and aspatial information effects in constructed markets. 
I 
Finally, Part 4 presents a new method for developing a set of prices for externalities and 
ecological relationships in forested wetlands. This method is based on the theory of hedonic 
pricing and tested using spatial econometric models. Part 2 has been submitted to the Journal 
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of Forest Economics and Part 4 to the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 
The third chapter will be submitted to Land Economics. 
Within this dissertation, I do not present a detailed discussion of the development of the 
land cover classification for the Cumberland Plateau (Objective 2). I provide a brief overview 
of the process on page 70 but refer readers to Strickland (2003) for a comprehensive, detailed 
description. As a comment on this process, Jeff Strickland and I deditated approximately three 
months of six to seven days per week· in front of a computer analyzing pixels on remotely 
sensed (i.e. , satellite) imagery in order to develop the classification. We are pleased to report 
an overall accuracy of 90 percent for these efforts. The forest class of the land cover 
classification was applied in the choice modeling analysis of Cumberland and Morgan county 
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Part 2 
Forest Amenity Provision Within a Compensation Framework 
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This chapter is a slightly r evised ver sion of a paper by the same name submitted to the Journal 
of Forest Economics in 2004 by Aar on R. Wells . . . . . .  . 
Abstract 
A compensation framewor k  based on a micr oeconomic analysis of agent behavior is 
developed for the case of impr oved for est amenity pr ovision. The lack of funding and 
competitive enr ollment in curr ent feder al pr ograms and non-pr ofit and pr ivate initiatives for 
pr ivate landowner s  coupled with for est pr oduct pr ices that do not r eflect the amenity value of 
for ests highlight the impor tance of a for est amenity en hancement pr ogram. We show that such 
a pr ogram is possible and would yield an efficient outcome under thr ee conditions: (1) 
contributor s  are willing to pay an amount that maximizes utility they der ive from for est 
amenities; (2) an inter mediary par ty sets a compensation pr ice based on contributor aggregate 
willingness to pay such that the social value of the pr ogram is maximized; and (3) a 
par ticipating landowner maximizes pr ofit given this incentive. Changes in these conditions 
and the incor por ation of stated and r evealed pr efer ence nonmar ket valuation techniques ar e 
futur e  dir ections for the framewor k. 
Keywords: N ontimber values; Public goods; Dir ect compensation; Behavior al analysis; 
Stated pr efer ence 
1. Introduction 
; 
For est ecosystems pr ovide a unique set of benefits that ar e neither r ecognized nor traded in 
tr aditional mar kets. Scenic beauty, car bon sequestr ation, wildlife habitat, and soil stabilization 
r epr esent a few of the multiple nonmar ket goods and ser vices or alternatively, for est 
amenities, supplied by for ests. Th e public goods natur e  of for est amenities impedes mar kets 
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from capitalizing these benefi ts into land values. Additionally, prices for forest products, such 
as timber or ginseng, do not refl ect the value of forest amenities or the effects of product 
removal on their integrity. Thus, landowners have limited monetary incentive to improve the 
supply of these amenities. The lack of market based incentives for improved forest 
management has typically been filled by landowner assistance programs funded by 
governm ent and private entities. However, current assistance programs are either 
underdeveloped or marked by limited fun ding and competitive en rollment, which can act to 
discourage potential landowners. 
N on-industrial, private forest landowners own approximately 58 percent of forestland in 
the Un ited States, representing a maj ority share of the land capable of producing forest 
amenities. However, only 5 percent of landowners have a written management plan and 97 
percent hold their land for reasons other than timber production. Approximately 70 percent of 
forestland is in ownerships exceeding 40 ha, with more than 85 percent of the landowners 
holding less than 20 ha (Birch 1 996). This characterization of forest landowners presents a set 
of challenges for the provision of forest amenities for three primary reasons. First, economies 
of scale may prevent small landowners from entering into the amenity program while enabling 
large landowners to capture all of the compensation. Second, highly fragm ented or parcelized 
holdings may not provide the area (ha) necessary to provide some amenities (namely, habitat 
for forest interior birds). Third, expected participation rates, based on the curr ent number of 
owners with a management plan, may be too low to j ustify implementing the program. 
A lternatively, a compensation program may be feasible given that nearly all landowners have 
preferences for nontimber amenities. If these landowners value the change in land rent from 
entering the program (i. e. , marginal benefits) more than the additional costs associated with 
entry (i. e. , marginal costs), then, as rational economic agents, landowners would be willing to 
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participate and the amenity program justified. Attention is directed toward the issue of 
landowner participation, and not on contributor or third party participation, because we view 
this as the most significant hurdle to the implementation of the program. 
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate through utility and profit maximization 
models that a direct form of monetary compensation in return for forest amenity provision is a 
feasible mechanism for increasing net social benefits of forests. We show that a utility 
maximizing contributor would be willing to pay an amount that when aggregated across all 
contributors and distributed by a value oriented third party satisfies supply conditions for 
participating rent-seeking landowners. The framework formalizes and extends the direct 
compensation mechanisms currently employed by various types of conservation-guided 
organizations, such as The Nature Conservancy and Defenders ofWildlife (see Ferraro 2001). 
While the programs provided by these organizations provide a useful basis for our 
framework, the case of hunting leases presents a more interesting structure. At present, 
hunting leases are the only tangible contract under which private, monetary compensation is 
transferred to private forest landowners in exchange for a nontraditional forest product (i.e., 
recreational access). 3 There are other examples of recreational access compensation schemes, 
involving off-highway vehicles and rock climbing, but these schemes are not as common as 
hunting leases.4 Regardless of the user group, the compensation mechanism for recreational 
access provides insight into the possible use of private lands for public goods provision: 
landowners who enter into these agreements maintain profit (rent) maximizing (seeking) 
behavior, even though the activity generating the costs and revenues is a nonmarket forest 
3 Recreational opportunities on private lands are presently not considered a public good and 
excluded from the framework we propose because these opportunities imply a type of right to the payee 
granted by the landowner that can be used to exclude other parties. 
4 An example of the growing popularity of hunting leases on private forestland is the publication by 
Timber Mart South, a principal source of forest product prices in the southern United States, of average, 
per acre price estimates by state for these leases (Timber Mart South 2003). To our knowledge, a series 
of published prices for other outdoor recreational leases does not exist. 
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good. Thus, the amenity program should be designed to appeal to the profit (rent) enhancing 
opportunities generated by forest amenity provision. On the other hand, research on the 
harvesting behavior of private forest landowners indicates that landowners may not be driven 
by profit motives since they currently provide forest amenities without compensation (Lee 
1997, Scarpa et al. 2 000). While this research shows that landowners are willing to manage for 
forest amenities, it underscores the importance of assuming active landowners manage with 
the intent of maximizing profit. Under our framework, landowners would be compensated for 
managing forest amenities, which may increase participation rates among owners, increase 
competition and output in amenity production, and lead to profit (rent) maximizing behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents the framework from 
the perspective of a contributor, third party organization, and participating landowner. Section 
3 provides a discussion of the model results and possible extensions to the framework. A 
concluding section summarizes the paper and offers an assessment of the practicality of the 
proposed compensation program. 
2. Compensation Framework 
The forest amenity compensation framework is based on three representative agents: 
contributor, conservation guided third party, and private landowner. A contributor is defined 
as an individual that is willing to pay some nonnegative sum of money in return for an 
improved stock of forest amenities. The third party is essentially an intermediary institution 
that collects and distributes contributions, approves participating landowners, and monitors the 
forest amenity enhancement program. The representative landowner is a nonindustrial, private 
forest landowner that meets certain land size requirements and is willing to accept 
contributions in return for incurred costs of improving on-site forest amenities. In addition to 
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these agents, the compensation framework is based on two models of utility theory - each 
borrowing from different economic perspectives on the preference structure of the agent, and a 
simple profit function. Random utility theory, which incorporates a stochastic element in 
preference modeling, and a Cobb-Douglas value function describe the decision calculus for 
the contributor and third party, respectively. The profit model for the landowner contains an 
environmental ethic term that helps to explain why an owner may participate in the proposed 
framework; this additional term is not typically included in forest supply analyses. In all 
models, we assume the agents have perfect information on the benefits of forest amenities, the 
outcome from their respective actions is common knowledge, and agents are risk neutral. 
Additionally, assume there are a large number of contributors and landowners so that one 
individual from either group cannot influence any outcome.5 For each utility function, assume 
strict quasi-concavity, continuity and transitivity of preferences, and local nonsatiation. 
Similarly, assume the profit function is continuous and strictly convex in prices. Finally, 
assume the functions are twice differentiable and monotonic and that all agents know their 
preferences and act on these preferences rationally. 
For these three models, T is the aggregate current level of forest amenities and T' is the 
level of forest amenities that would be provided if the amenity program were active (T'>> 1). 
We define level in both quality and quantity terms, with quality referring to more productive 
(e.g., greater habitat diversity) or aesthetically appealing (e.g., lower stand density) amenities 
and quantity representing the aggregate number of hectares in a forest amenity class. Both T 
and T'are vectors of h elements (h = l , . . .  ,H), with each element representing a specific level 
of a forest amenity (e.g., 25 ha of moderate quality wildlife habitat). The basis of the 
5 A consequence of this assumption is a possible increase in the incentive to free-ride. That is, by 
increasing the number of contributors, it is easier for the marginal contributor to decide that a sufficient 
number of individuals have contributed such that their additional contribution will not change the 
overall outcome. Thus, he does not contribute. 
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proposed program is that landowners can improve the level of forest amenities through land 
management practices, accordingly T'= L;Lhtih ', where i indexes participating landowners (i = 
1 , . . .  ,1) and t/ denotes the aggregate contribution (ha) of amenities by i under the program.6 
Since T' is a continuous public good (i.e., nonrival and nonexcludable in production and 
consumption), each contributor consumes the same amount of T' regardless of their 
, 
contribution and the third party compensates participating landowners an amount equal to a 
share of the sum of individual contributions.7 
The principal qualification for landowner participation in the program is approval by the 
third party of a forest amenity enhancement plan written by an approved forest manager. 
Additional requirements include a minimum and maximum number of hectares in order to 
keep enrollment competitive and a minimum number of years enrolled (e.g., 10  yrs) so that 
management recommendations can be fully implemented and possibly evaluated. Contributors 
face a reduced set of enrollment constraints and are principally bound by a voluntary contract 
to contribute an annual monetary payment for a specified number of years (e.g., 5 yrs). 
Finally, a third party will support the program only if the sum of contributions equals or 
exceeds the costs of administering the program. 
I 6 For notational convenience, L: = L;. 
i= 1 
7 The opportunity for individuals to free-ride on the contributions of others to the improved supply 
of forest amenities is a concern given the public goods nature of these amenities. To address this 
problem, we assume that contributors aware of free-riders account for them by either lowering 
(possibly, out of frustration) or increasing (to take into account lower aggregate level of contributions) 
their contribution amount (i.e, willingness to pay). Contributors oblivious to free-riding simply 
contribute the amount that maximizes their utility (given budgetary constraints). In any case, the mean 
or median contribution from these three types of contributors serves as a useful measure of society's 
willingness to pay for improved forest amenity provision - this value (whether mean or median) is 
applied in our analysis. We present the framework and model solutions as conditional on the efficiency 
reducing, distortionary influence of free-riders. 
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2. 1. Utility Maximization: Contributor 
A basic assumption underlying the contributor component of the forest amenity 
compensation program is that rational, economic agents derive utility from forest amenities: 
u = u(T, z, q) [ 1 ]  
where T i s  a vector of current forest amenities, z is a composite good, and q is a vector of 
attributes of all other nonmarket goods and services. In equation [1], the individual does not 
necessarily consume forest amenities, as she would the composite good, and instead gains 
satisfaction from their mere existence. A contributor (or, non free-rider) is defined as an agent 
that is indifferent between paying some positive sum of money for improved amenity 
provision and remaining at the status quo: 
-
(/)0 > (/) > 0 [2] 
where o indexes each contributor and a contributor can be a landowner (i, . . .  ,1), but not the 
landowner generating the forest amenities.8 The remaining notation is explained as follows: 
vo( •) is the indirect utility function, mo denotes income, (/)0 is a continuous contribution amount 
that must be greater than some minimum threshold set by the third party, and Po is a vector of 
prices for all other goods. Equation [2] identifies the tradeoffs between forest amenities and 
other household goods and services a contributor must evaluate when determining an amount 
8 In order for the analysis to proceed and for the compensation framework to be legitimately 
established, we assume that the number of contributors exceeds the number of participating landowners 
(i.e., I c 0). 
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to contribute. The existence of rp0 in equation [2] implies the amenity program has been 
implemented, thus T'replaces T in equation [1] .  In this case, fPo enters directly as an element 
of Po = ( rp0, Pz). For each contributor, rp represents a contributor's willingness to pay (WTP), 
which we assume is equal to her maximum WTP for improved forest amenity provision. 
Furthermore, for all o, fPo can be interpreted as that point along the budget line that is just 
f 
equal to the marginal rate of substitution between T' and z. In both equations [ 1] and [2], the 
contributor gains utility at a decreasing rate from increases in r: q, and m0-rp0 (refer to Table 
1 ). 
If we model the contributor's preferences from the perspective of the third party using 
random utility theory (McFadden 1981 ), there will be elements that the contributor is aware of 
but that have not been revealed to the third party. The third party will need to account for this 
discrepancy and can do so through the inclusion of a stochastic term with elements of the 
contributor's preferences that can be measured (the following borrows from Hanemann 1999, 
pp. 35-48): 
[3] 
u( •) represents the deterministic or measurable component of the contributor's direct latent 
utility associated with a particular state j (j = 1 ,  . . .  ,J) and Eoj is the random error term. It is 
important to model the preferences of the contributor from the perspective of the third party 
and with a stochastic term for two reasons. First, if the forest amenity program were to be 
implemented, the third party would need to know the manner in which forest amenities enter 
into the preferences of a contributor and the extent of aggregate willingness to pay. Second, if 
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Table 1 
Expected signs and interpretations for equations [ 1] - [20] m the amenity compensation 
framework 
Expected Sign 
au,JaiJI'' > o, &u,JaiJI''2 < o 
au,Jazo > 0, &ujazo 2 < 0 
au,Jaqo > 0, &u;!aq/ > 0 
8vo/8mol > 0, &v0/8mo? < 0 § 
8vo/8rpo/ < 0 § 
8vo/8Pol < 0, &vo/8po? < 0 § 
8vo/8X0[ > 0, &vo/8xo/ < 0 § 
8v0/8qo/ > 0, &v0/8qo/ > 0 § 
a v;ar ·  > o; & v;aT '2 < o 
av;aL > o; &v;aL2 < o 
8T '/8Wg > O  
8T '/88> 0; &T '/882 < 0 
av;a8< o; &v;ad- > o 
av;awg > o; &v;aw/ > o 
avg !a'¥ < O  
aO* ;awg > o 
80*/iftv < 0 
aO* ;ar < o; &0* ;ar2 > o 
a7i;Ja8 > o 
a!i;!a/; > o; &!i;la/;2 < o 
87i;l8d; > 0; &!i;lad/ < 0 
a/;laa; ? o 
Interpretation 
Diminishing marginal utility of forest amenities to contributor o 
Diminishing marginal utility of the composite good 
Strictly increasing marginal utility with increases in goods attributes 
Diminishing marginal indirect utility of income for contributor o 
Indirect utility will decrease with increases in the contribution amount 
Strictly decreasing indirect utility with increases in goods prices 
Diminishing marginal indirect utility of goods consumed under program I 
Strictly increasing marginal indirect utility with increases in the attributes 
of goods consumed in program I 
Diminishing marginal value to third party g of providing additional 
hectares in the forest amenity program 
Diminishing marginal value to g of providing added support to all other 
programs 
Level of forest amenities under the compensation program increases with 
increases to the budget of g 
Level of forest amenities increases at a decreasing rate with increases in 
the compensation price paid by g to i 
Indirect utility for g decreases at an increasing rate with increases in the 
price paid to participating landowners 
Strictly increasing, indirect marginal value of supplemental contributions 
Increasing transaction costs associated with the amenity program 
diminish the indirect utility g derives from supporting the program 
Increases in contributions will lead to an increase in the price paid to i for 
hectares enrolled 
Compensation paid to i by g decreases with increases in program related 
transactions costs 
Per unit compensation price decreases at an increasing rate with increases 
in the aggregate number of hectares enrolled in the program 
Participating landowner profit is an increasing function of the price paid 
for forest amenities h 
Timber harvesting initially increases landowner profit; after some point, 
additional harvesting degrades the site to the point that remediation costs 
are incurred 
Decreasing marginal returns to profit are realized from additional passive 
rent generating activities; this occurs due to the carrying capacity of the 
land being exceeded (i.e., too many activities degrade the site) 
Landowner profit increases at a decreasing rate with increases in the 
number of hectares enrolled in the program; results from the direct 
relationship between area (ha) and costs associated with forest amenity 
management 
Ecological and environmental conditions have diverse and factor specific 
effects on the amount of timber harvested by i 
Improvements in timber attributes (e.g., higher valued species) will 
increase i' s profit 
The environmental ethic of i may or may not influence the amount of 
timber harvested 
Similar to the above, the amount harvested by i may or may not be 
responsive to i's hurdle rate 
A functional dependence exists between passive rent generating activities 
and timber harvesting; the sign would be determined by the management 
actions of each i 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Expected Sign 
at ';fafi ?  o 
at;lae1> o 
(e; > e;) 
§ For all / programs;j,j' e /. 
Interpretation 
Timber harvesting will be necessary in some cases to enhance forest 
amenities (e.g., harvesting to increase scenic beauty) and in other cases it 
will have deleterious effects (e.g., harvesting in riparian areas) 
The stronger i's environmental ethic, which includes personal beliefs on 
land stewardship and the importance of sustainable forest management, 
the more likely i will enroll in the program (given that i's ethic is at least 
as strong as some threshold level, below which i would choose not to 
participate) 
the third party assumed that it could measure all significant elements of the contributor's 
utility and designed the program around this assumption, deviations from its expected 
contributions would threaten the viability of the program. A drawback to the above random 
utility representation of contributor preferences is that the third party cannot model the 
influence of each contributor's actions on the behavior of the other contributors, which is the 
standard form for analyzing private provision of continuous public goods (Varian 1 992, p. 
420; Hanley et al. 1997, p. 44). 
Given the random utility (RU) theory framework, the contributor will seek to maximize 
direct utility from forest amenities, given by equation [3], subject to a budget constraint: 
Pojlj + Zoj = mo [4] 
where the price of the composite good is normalized to one and income is constant across all 
states J. Restrictions placed on equations [3] and [4] under RU limit the contributor to 
purchasing only discrete quantities of lj, 1j = lj,or T, where in the latter case no price is paid, 
and enjoying increasing levels of forest amenities as long as the level ofthe composite good is 
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nonzero (i.e., weak complementarity holds). If the contributor chooses state} �  which includes 
T� then the indirect utility she derives from improved forest amenities can be written as 
[5] 
where v( •) on the right hand side represents deterministic indirect utility and & captures 
stochastic elements in utility associated with state j. 
Suppose instead that the contributor decides to remain at the status quo state j (Ij = 1), 
which does not include improved forest amenities. The contributor will do so only if the 
indirect utility from j is greater than the utility from j 1 :  
> 0  if &oj' - &0j < V0j - Voj' 
= 0 if &0j' - &0j = V0j - Voj' 




Equations [6a] and [6b] contradict equation [5], where the contributor chose j '  because it 
provided the greatest indirect utility. Equation [6c], then, is the only response that coincides 
with the preferred state j 1 and can be written more directly as 
[6c'] 
36 
However, since c is a random error term and because the third party does not know ex ante the 
true preferences of the contributor over the possible bundles, the third party estimates the 
probability that the contributor will choose } 1  over j. Given equation [6c'], the probability of 
choosing between two mutually exclusive states j 1 and j is given by 
[7] 
If we assume a linearly additive indirect utility function, the deterministic component for 
state j 1 in equation [7] becomes 
[8] 
where Xor is a vector of independent variables from equation [5] and tPo' is a vector of 
parameters measuring the influence of each variable on contributor utility. Equation [8] gives 
the utility of the maximizing contributor when she chooses state/ = (1}� zj1 with prices Por = 
( rp0, Pz) and attributes qr, subject to a budget constraint. Finally, substituting equation [ 19] into 
equation [ 1 8] specifying a specific distribution (typically Wiebull) to the stochastic term, the 
contributor willingness to pay (i.e., contribution amount) (/Jo * is given by 
[9] 
where t/J, is the parameter estimate for income. 
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2.2. Value Maximization: Third Party 
A third party is defined to be a conservation-guided, intermediary institution with the 
administrative infrastructure capable of collecting and dispersing funds and information with 
some degree of efficiency. The inclusion of an intermediary body in the compensation 
framework is necessary for three primary reasons. Foremost, third parties, such as non-profit 
organizations, are value and not profit oriented, which is a more consistent preference 
structure when the provision of public goods is the issue. A third party is distinguishable from 
governmental bodies (although this may not always be true), an important distinction in the 
case of using private lands for public goods provision. That is, private landowners and 
contributors may not participate if they believe there is some connection between their efforts 
and increasing regulations on private lands. Third, since contributors are mostly familiar with 
the organizational framework and objectives of intermediary institutions, transactions costs for 
the proposed forest amenity program may be lower than if the program was implemented 
privately or federally. 
The basic value structure of a third party depends on maximizing societal value of its 
programs, given a budget balancing condition between contributions and operating costs. 
Assume in the present case the third party implicitly derives value from the total number of 
hectares funded through the forest amenity program (T') and all other programs (L): 
[ 10] 
; 
where g indexes the third party.9 Equation [ 10] can be explicitly represented by a Cobb-
Douglas functional form: 
9 We index the third party because it is possible to have more than one party facilitating the transfer 
of donations from contributors to landowners. The case of forest certification is a good example. 
38 
[ 1 1]  
where A is  a constant of value. A Cobb-Douglas form was selected to model contributor 
preferences for several reasons. Namely, this function has positive but diminishing marginal 
values of T' and L (8V/8T'> 0; ffVI8T' 2 < 0; 8V/8L > 0; ffVI8L2 < 0), permits the marginal 
value of T' to increase with contributions (ffV!aT' 8Wg > 0), and the elasticity of marginal 
value with respect to all other programs is less than one (Max and Lehman 1988). Moreover, 
the exponents can be interpreted as the shares of the third party's value allocated to T' and L. 
The third party maximizes equation [ 1 1 ]  given a budget balancing condition10: 
w. = L + 81'' + "' . 0 = �!C) g r , V\. 1  [ 12] 
where W is the aggregate level of donations or alternatively, the budget size ( rp
* 
e Wg; rp* = 
Lof/Jo • ), o is the average price per unit of forest amenity (i.e., ha) paid to participating 
landowners, 'I' is a parameter measuring transaction costs associated with administering and 
monitoring the program in each region r, K represents the landowner's amenity management 
intensity, and the price for L has been normalized to one. Following Kant (2000, 2003), 
transactions costs 'I' are strictly positive and vary across regions due to different 
socioeconomic conditions in each region. Equation [ 12] can be interpreted as the participation 
constraint for the third party, where the program will be administered only if the costs (right-
hand side) are less than or equal to aggregate contributions. Note that the third party sums 
vertically the willingness to pay of each contributor when setting o since all contributors 
consume the same amount of forest amenities. The compensation price o is constant across 
10 We assume the third party realizes income solely from contributions. 
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forest amenities h but varies with the intensity of amenity management pursued by the 
landowner. For example, a landowner could decide to either designate a 30 m riparian buffer 
(implying a restricted management zone) and plant tree seedlings within the buffer or simply 
leave a 10 m buffer. The landowner would be compensated an amount � · (� ' = ,�+ � ; ' e 
(0, 1 )] for the additional effort. 
By substituting the constraint (equation [12]) into the objective function (equation [ 1 1 ]) 
and solving the first order condition for T'we obtain 
T' * = a(W- 'l'r) I �  [ 13] 
Equation [ 13] implies that the optimal number of hectares funded by the third party for forest 
amenity management is a decreasing function of the price paid to participating landowners 
(BT' */ 8�< 0) and an increasing function of the budget size (BT' */ BW> 0). These results are 
consistent with a priori beliefs about the relationship between variables (see Table 1) .  
Applying the result from equation [ 13], the indirect value the third party derives from 
providing the amenity program and all other programs is given by 
[ 14] 
where v is the indirect value function, p is a vector of prices for all other programs L, and all 
' 
other terms defined earlier. The basic properties of v( •) are satisfied in equation [ 14 ], that is, 
v( •) is non-increasing in program costs and non-decreasing in contribution receipts (refer to 
Table 1 for additional interpretations). Given that the third party faces strictly positive costs 
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for providing the programs, it will maximize equation [ 14] over 8, "'' and p subject to the 
budget constraint in equation [ 12] :  
Max A[a(W- 'l'r)/b]a[(1 - a)(W- 'l'r)] 1-a 
t5, w.p >> o 
where 'I' and p have been normalized to one. The first order conditio� for 8yields 
8* = a(W- 'I') 
[ 15] 
[ 1 6] 
Equation [ 16] gives the minimum price 8* at which T'* would be the value maximizing choice 
for the third party. The price is consistent with a priori expectations that the minimum price 
paid to participating landowners will increase with increases in the budget (88*/8W > 0) and 
decrease with increases in program related transactions costs (88*/8'!' > 0). Dividing equation 
[ 16] by T'* yields the minimum, per unit (ha-1) price, which decreases at an increasing rate 
with increases in the number ofhectares enrolled in the program (see Table 1 ). 
2.3. Profit Maximization: Participating Landowners11 
We extend Birch's (1996) definition of a non-industrial, private forest landowner to 
include any individual that owns at least two hectares of land that contain a minimum forest 
stocking of 0.7 square meters ofbasal area on at least 20 percent of the property and that does 
not hold any wood production facilities. A landowner is considered a participant if the third 
1 1  A utility-based behavioral model, similar to that applied to the contributor, could have been used 
to analyze landowner reactions to the amenity program. However, in our compensation framework, 
landowners are paid to provide an improved set of forest amenities. Faced with the opportunity to earn 
income on a service once provided for free (passive provision), or possibly at a loss (active provision), 
landowners have an incentive to supply a level of amenities that will generate the most income. Thus, a 
profit maximization framework seems appropriate. 
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I I . I I 
party endorses his forest amenity enhancement plan, which is prepared by an approved forest 
manager, and agrees to follow this plan for a set number of years. In order to simplify the 
analysis and make the end result more tractable, we make the following assumptions. First, 
the market for forest amenity provision is competitive such that one landowner cannot unduly 
influence the price received or aggregate quantity supplied of forest amenities. Second, each 
landowner is constrained in the management activities he undertakes, whether for timber 
production or amenity enhancement, by the ecological capacity of the land. We assume that 
landowners do not account for the management actions of other participating landowners 
when choosing a profit maximizing level of amenity provision (except for the case of 
landowner collaboration in connecting adjacent parcels). This assumption seems reasonable 
given the high information costs associated with each landowner obtaining information on all 
other participating landowners and then using that information to update his management plan. 
Finally, we assume that the set of possible management plans (�) from which landowner i 
selects the profit maximizing strategy can be written as: 
- -
�(z, g I e) = {(zi, gi ,Ji, di, t/) I zi = zi, gi = gi, ei, t/ � 0} [ 17] 
where z is the quantity of land owned by i, fixed at z;, g denotes the ecological capacity of the 
land, held fixed at gi = gi, e is a measure of the landowner's environmental ethic, Ji denotes 
quantity (e.g., thousand board feet) of stumpage available for harvest, di denotes passive rent 
generating activities (such as hunting leases), and t/ is given by a convex production function 
and represents the aggregate number of hectares dedicated to amenity management by i under 
the program. t/ is a feasible element of any management plan selected by a landowner based 
on evidence that amenities influence the forest management activities undertaken by an owner 
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(Binkley 1 98 1 ,  Max and Lehman 1988, Dennis 1 989, Birch 1 996, Lee 1 997, Schaberg et al. 
1 999, Scarpa et al. 2000). 
Similar to the contributor and third party analyses, landowners face participation 
constraints. Principally, landowners will participate in the program if the benefits from doing 
so are greater than the benefits derived from some other set of management activities :  
O*t;' + p; m; ' > p;m; [ 1 8] 
where m '  and m are feasible management plans (m � m e Y;) and p is the price received for 
each plan. The constraint in equation [ 18] could also be interpreted as the price that 
compensates owners for the difference between what they could have made selling timber on 
an optimal economic rotation versus a longer rotation that includes forest amenities. A second 
participation constraint is embodied in the environmental ethic of the landowner, where we 
would expect to observe higher rates of participation among landowners with stronger feelings 
towards stewardship and sustainable forestry (see last row of Table 1 ). This constraint is based 
on research that shows a significant relationship between the environmental ethic of a 
landowner and participation in an incentive based program (Kurtz and Lewis 1 98 1 ,  English et 
al. 1 993, Weaver 1 996, Luzar and Diagne 1 999) and decisions regarding management 
activities (Bliss and Martin 1 989, Bliss et al. 1 997). 
Given the above assumptions and constraints, a participating landowner will maximize 
profit from the sale of timber, rents generated through passive activities, and hectares 
dedicated to the enhanced provision of forest amenities: 
43 
where p is a vector of market prices, B denotes the agglomeration bonus, a denotes a vector of 
ecological and environmental conditions specific to the property (e.g., soil composition and 
slope), s denotes a set of timber attributes (e.g., species and volume), f3 denotes the hurdle rate, 
subscripts f and d on p denote prices of standing timber and passive activities, respectively, h 
denotes the number of hectares dedicated to the management of a specific amenity (e.g., 
scenic beauty), and c denotes activity costs. 12 The costs associated with providing t/ include 
both transformation (combining physical inputs to provide improved amenity outputs) and 
transaction (third party verification and assessment) costs (Kant 2003, p. 43). These costs may 
be significant and greater than the benefits of program participation if the landowner pursues 
simultaneous management of timber and nontimber outputs across large tracts of forestland 
due to complex spatial coordination problems (Swallow and Wear 1 993). Regarding the 
agglomeration bonus B, only adjacent landowners that agree to collectively manage their 
adjoining parcels according to a single management plan qualify (see Parkhurst et al. 2002). 
The variables measuring the influence of site specific factors on timber productivity and the 
passive rent generating capability of the land are expected variables for this type of function. 
However, the inclusion of an environmental ethic term is an important distinction from 
previous models (Newman 1987, Hellsten 1988, Newman and Wear 1 993), excepting Binkley 
( 1981  ), because it directly enters into the decision calculus of the landowner. The functional 
dependence of passive rent generating activities and amenity management on timber 
harvesting (and vice versa) implies that the activities are not mutually exclusive. We cannot 
12 An obvious limitation of this model is the assumption of a linearly additive functional form, 
which assumes separability and perfect substitutability between factors. Kant (2003) raises this issue as 
a shortcoming of standard neoclassical approaches to modeling complex, interrelated and inherently 
nonlinear ecological processes. Our only defense is that this simple (and somewhat over specified) 
model is intended to emphasize the multitude of decision variables an everyday forest landowner might 




say, a priori, if the sign of the relationship between the sets of terms is positive or negative 
since that result would seem to be landowner specific (see Table 1). 
Applying Hotelling's lemma to equation [ 19] and evaluating the profit function at the 
optimal compensation level ( 8* from equation [ 1 6]), the net supply function for private 
provision of forest amenities is given by: 
[20] 
The result from equation [20] is optimal in the sense that it maximizes a participating 
landowner's profit, given that contributors are contributing an amount that maximizes their 
utility and the third party is allocating contributions to maximize the social value of its 
programs. However, inherent in any model of private provision of public goods is free-riding, 
which causes the solution to be inefficient and suboptimal (Myles 1 995, pp. 279-284, Hanley 
et al. 1 997, p. 45). Thus we can only state that equation [20] is a second best solution possible 
within the outlined compensation framework. 
3. Model Discussion 
Forest amenities represent a unique set of public goods and include carbon sequestration, 
soil stabilization, and wildlife habitat. Private landowners are responsible for a significant 
share of forest amenities, yet many are unaware of the potential to improve their provision. 
Current assistance programs and incentive schemes are designed to inform landowners and 
share the costs of implementing amenity-based management plans, but are either marked by 
limited funding or have not been fully developed. Thus, we construct a compensation 
framework to demonstrate the dependence of society on landowners and landowners on 
45 
society and the interaction that must occur in order for landowners to recognize the 
significance of their property in forest amenity provision. 
The results given in equations [9], [ 16], and [20] imply four potential solutions for the 
efficient provision of forest amenities within the compensation framework. First, if 
contributors are not willing to pay (i.e., rp0 * = 0) and landowners are not willing to manage for 
improved forest amenities (t/ = 0), then T 1 * = 0 and the solution is simply T (the current level 
of amenities). However, if contributors are willing to pay but landowners are not willing to 
manage, then equation [9] does not hold and the solution is inconsistent. In other words, 
landowners are not acting as profit maximizers. This result also represents a disconnect 
between contributors who demand increased forest amenities and forest landowners who 
collectively control the supply of amenities. If landowners are willing to manage for improved 
amenities but contributors are not willing to pay, the efficient level cannot be met. The 
approach of Comes and Sandler ( 1996, pp. 24�343) to the private provision of public goods 
provides an interesting interpretation of this outcome: if landowners provide some improved 
level of forest amenities and this is an increase in endowment to others and forest amenities 
are a normal good, additional contributions may result (depending on the shape of the Nash­
Cournot reaction functions). Thus, if landowners are willing to take the first step and show 
their commitment to improving forest amenities, then regardless of initial contributor behavior 
the supply of amenities will approach T 1 *. Furthermore, it is possible for landowners to 
improve the current level of forest amenities without compensation; this result would rely 
heavily on the environmental ethic of the landowner. Finally, if landowners are willing to 
manage for improved forest amenities and contributors are willing to pay, the optimal level is 
satisfied (T = T 1 *). 13 Figure 1 provides a map of all four possible solutions. 




Unwilling to Willing to 
manage manage 
Unwilling to T T '* < T  
Contributor pay (T> O; T ' * = O) (T, T ' *  > 0) 
Willing to 
Inconsistent T= T ' *  
pay 
Notation: T= current level of forest amenities; T ' *  = optimal level of forest 
amenities with the compensation program, conditional on inefficiency effects 
of free-riders. 
Figure 1 
Potential solutions for the provision of forest amenities. 
The above solutions are dependent on a number of assumptions, such as utility and profit 
maximization as agent objectives, but most importantly on a belief system. An individual will 
contribute to the forest amenity program if she believes her contribution will improve the level 
of amenities by some measurable amount.14 Likewise, a landowner will participate if he 
believes land management activities can increase the level of forest amenities and the 
compensation for such actions is at least as great as the costs. A third party acts as the 
mediator between the two agents and will do so if it believes cooperation is possible, its 
budget balancing condition is satisfied, and social welfare will be improved. This belief 
system is characterized by high information costs in that each agent forms their belief on 
verifiable information that an outcome more favorable than the status quo (T ' > T) is possible. 
Decades of research in natural resource management show demonstrably that proper land 
management practices can improve the quality of forest ecosystems and the level of forest 
14 This response ignores the possibility of contributing based on a "warm-glow" feeling the agent 
may achieve through the act of giving. 
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amenities. However, transferring this information in a format the average contributor and 
landowner can understand is a significant task. 
The compensation framework could be extended to include the belief system through 
expected utility and profit models. For example, we could assume agents seek strategies that 
have the greatest probability of returning positive profit or greater utility (Kant 2003). 
Additionally, the effects of imperfect information, nonuniform agents, and different attitudes 
toward risk (i.e., risk averse or inclined) would be worthwhile extensions to the framework. 
Modeling non-convexities in amenity production is another feasible extension. Calish et al. 
( 1978) and Swallow et al. ( 1990) show how management objectives, such as managing for 
different types of wildlife, and forest policies are sensitive to the assumption of convex 
production functions. The authors provide detailed examples and mathematical expressions 
showing that biological functions of a forest ecosystem should only be modeled by function 
specific non-convex production functions; by not modeling the process in this manner, the 
effectiveness of the objectives and policies could be compromised. Non-convexities can be 
incorporated in the present framework by allowing compensation (equation [ 16]) to depend on 
the type of forest amenity h managed by i. Additional improvements include modeling the 
influence of one contributor's contribution on another contributor's utility and similarly, the 
effect of the level of amenity production chosen by one landowner on another's  behavior. 
Changes in the assumption of competitive supply conditions is a possible extension, given that 
70 percent of forest land in the U.S. is controlled by less than 10  percent of landowners (Birch 
1 996). 
One of the more promising extensions of the framework involves incorporating contributor 
willingness to pay (WTP} information obtained through stated and revealed preference 
nonmarket valuation methods, such as choice modeling (CM) and hedonic pricing. CM 
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involves the creation of a hypothetical market through surveys in which participants select a 
preferred policy from a collection of policies. Each policy is defined by the same set of 
attributes, including a cost term, but different attribute quality (cost) levels. The random utility 
model is used to explain the respondents' choices and is consistent with several limited 
dependent econometric procedures, namely multinomial and mixed logit models, which 
enable estimation of equation [9]. The hedonic price method (HPM) <;ould be used to uncover 
the marginal implicit prices of each contributor for forest amenities by analyzing their housing 
choices. The HPM relies on a different utility theoretic and estimation procedure than CM, 
thus providing a richer picture of the contributor's  WTP.15 The combined application of these 
methods to estimate WTP is important to the compensation framework because our 
subsequent analyses of third party and landowner behavior, .and ultimately, the supply of 
forest amenities, rely on equation [9]. 
4. Conclusion 
Forest amenity management is an integral component of sustainable forest management 
that has not yet been widely promulgated in landowner assistance programs. The 
Environmental Quality Incentive Program and the Forest Land Enhancement Program 
specifically address forest amenities by providing guidance and cost-share assistance to 
landowners in exchange for management that improves amenities, restores damaged 
ecosystems, and promotes long-term forest sustainability (USDA 2003). These and related 
programs are limited in their funding and technical resources, consequently discouraging 
many landowners from participating or simply leaving landowners unaware of the 
1 5  Combining revealed and stated preference valuation techniques has become an important research 
method because of the gains in information and reductions in uncertainty surrounding true WTP 
(Cameron 1992, Adamowicz et al. 1 994, Adamowicz et al. 1997, Earnhart 2001). 
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opportunities. However, there are examples of programs such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program and Wildlife Habitat Improvement Program where positive outcomes result because 
landowners are informed and given equitable incentives. We believe these two elements are 
the key to success for any program designed to improve forest amenity provision. 
The framework we develop for improved forest amenity provision is based on incentives, a 
conservation-guided third party, and a belief system. The framework explicitly incorporates 
forest amenities in the utility and profit functions of contributors and landowners who have 
voluntarily agreed to participate in a program administered by the third party. We show that if 
each agent acts rationally on his or her preferences for forest amenities, a compensation 
amount can be derived that would lead to a higher level of amenities. The framework accounts 
for the environmental ethic of each landowner by modeling participation as an increasing 
function of a landowner's commitment to stewardship. The concept of cooperative landowner 
management is also incorporated because in some cases, such as endangered species, 
cooperative management may be the only feasible strategy to pursue. The weaknesses of the 
framework include high information requirements, convex functions in amenity production, 
and a profit maximization model for landowners. Addressing these issues and incorporating 
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Information Effects in Choice Modeling: A Spatial and Aspatial Case Study 
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This chapter is a slightly revised version of a paper by the same name to be submitted to the 
journal Land Economics by Aaron R. Wells and Donald G. Hodges. My use of the word "we" 
in this chapter refers to my co-authors and myself. My primary contributions to this paper 
include ( 1) development of the problem into a work relevant to my study of environmental 
valuation, (2) incorporation of geographic information systems and remote sensing, (3) most 
of the gathering and interpretation of the literature, (4) econometric models, (5) most of the 
analysis, and ( 6) most of the writing . . . . . .  . 
Abstract 
This study evaluates the effect of forest land cover and information about future land use 
change on respondent preferences and willingness to pay for alternative hypothetical forest 
amenity enhancement options. Respondent choices among 1 1  options were modeled in 
correlated coefficients, panel random parameters logit model. Land use change information 
and the amount of forest land cover significantly influenced respondent preferences, choices, 
and stated willingness to pay. Hicksian welfare estimates ranged from $57.42 to $25.53, 
depending on policy specification, information level, and econometric model. These results 
provide further evidence of choice sensitivity to constructed market framing and indicate a 
role for GIS and remote sensing in stated preference research. 
Keywords: Stated preference, GIS, Remote sensing, Information effects, Mixed logit 
1. Introduction 
The basic premise of any study investigating information effects within a constructed 
market posits the context jn which a decision is made affects the outcome and changes in 
context should yield different outcomes (Randall et al. 1983). Typically, changes are 
exogenously induced by the researcher in hopes of testing a hypothesis about expected 
consumer behavior. A standard hypothesis given in the literature states the probability a 
consumer will choose to pay for an environmental good, conditional on new positive 
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information introduced into the market setting, will increase relative to the control market, 
assuming all other aspects of the market remain the same (Munro and Hanley 1999). 
Correspondingly, stated willingness to pay for the good should increase (Cummings et al. 
1 986). This hypothesis has been modified by several researchers to analyze consumer choice 
conditional on different levels of information (Poe and Bishop 2001) as well as information 
regarding possible uses of the valued good (Bergstrom et at. 1 990), substitute and 
complementary environmental goods (Whitehead and Blomquist 1991 ), and resource quality 
(Blomquist and Whitehead 1 998; Hoehn and Randall 2002). Additionally, the effect of too 
much information (Bergstrom and Stoll 1 990) and respondent effort to obtain more 
information (Berrens et al. 2004) has been tested within the information effects framework. To 
date, though, the standard hypothesis has not been extended to the analysis of consumer 
behavior when information about future urbanization that could reduce both quality and level 
of the environmental good is introduced into the constructed market. Moreover, the hypothesis 
has not been extended to investigate the effects of spatial land cover information on 
respondent preferences and stated choices. 
The information effects hypotheses we tested are divided into aspatial and spatial 
categories differentiated by the source of the underlying data and the source of the effect yet 
linked by a common respondent. For the aspatial test, the data are generated by market 
participant attributes, choices, and choice characteristics while for the spatial test, data are 
objectively generated by measuring the amount of forest land cover around each participant. 
The aspatial information effect is researcher controlled and implemented by simply 
augmenting the control market with new, potentially negative information. The information 
we introduce informs the respondent of the possibility a hypothetical 50-acre tract of forest 
land in their area will be converted to a residential subdivision. Regarding the spatial 
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information effects test, we hypothesize that the amount of forest land cover surrounding a 
respondent is an element of the respondent's information set and changes in the amount of 
forest cover, due to land use change, for example, influence her decision making process. The ;' 
source of the information effect for the spatial test is exogenous to the researcher and instead 
determined by each respondent's  discrete housing choice. Collectively, we econometrically 
test each information effects hypothesis with generalized nonlinear probability models. 
The constructed market setting for investigating these information effects is a survey 
administered by mail to 3000 residents in 2 counties on the Cumberland Plateau in Tennessee. 
The basis for the survey is an assessment of preferences for current forest amenity levels, 
proposed (hypothetical) changes to these levels, and willingness to pay to secure such 
changes. The survey was designed consistent with the stated preference method of choice 
modeling, and correspondingly, random utility theory, and consists of 5 choice sets with 3 
options within each set. One option always remains the same with 10  alternative forest 
amenity enhancement options presented to the respondent over the course of the survey. We 
employed choice modeling, as opposed to contingent valuation, because this method permits 
evaluation of multiple management options (plans) within a single instrument. From an 
econometric perspective, the additional variability in choice attributes and choices per 
respondent improves estimation efficiency and applicability of results. Relatively few studies 
have applied stated preference techniques for forest amenity valuation. A review of this 
literature shows an interesting division in that most of the earlier studies employ the 
' 
contingent valuation method (Walsh et al. 1990, Hanley and Ruffell 1993, Macmillan and 
Duff 1998) while many later studies apply choice modeling or another form of conjoint 
analysis (Adamowicz et al. 1998, Hanley et al. 1998, Schaberg et al. 1999, Baarsma 2003, Xu 
et al. 2003). 
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2. Random Utility Model 
We specified a random utility model to explain respondent behavior for forest amenities as 
well as to test for the effects of land use change information and surrounding forest land cover 
on participant choices and willingness to pay within the constructed market. The basis of 
random utility theory is the division of latent utility an individual derives from a given bundle 
of goods and services into two components, one which the researcher is able to measure and 
the other capturing unobservable elements. The combination of these two terms permits the 
development of a probability model for individual choice which, given certain distributional 
assumptions, can then be applied over all choices and individuals in a limited dependent 
variable econometric model. Following Hanemann (1999), 
[ 1 ]  
where Uijr denotes latent direct utility individual i derives in state j at time t from composite 
good x, which is not state dependent, forest amenity quality e as specified by the researcher, 
the amount (m2) of forest land cover I around an individual, and individual specific 
demographic attributes z. In a choice modeling based constructed market, subscript t denotes 
choice sets or collections of alternative policy options with similar attributes but varying 
attribute quality levels. The specification of time indicates the panel nature of the data 
generating process in multiple choice set, constructed markets. The additional term I is unique 
to this study and captures the influence of environmental setting that is exogenous to both the 
researcher and the respondent. The right hand side of equation [ 1 ]  represents the indirect 
utility i derives from e, I, and z, in addition to net income y, and E is an econometric error term 
that provides a measure of the unobservable or unmeasured factors that influence utility. The 
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indirect utility term in random utility theory is commonly referred to as the systematic 
component since it is observable over all choices and given a linear functional form: 
[2] 
where h is a vector of choice specific attributes that change with t and w is a vector of 
individual specific attributes that do not change with t. 
Choice modeling provides a measurement framework consistent with random utility theory 
in that multiple options are evaluated by each respondent and the option chosen is revealed 
preferred to all other feasible options. Since we observe the option chosen, options not chosen, 
choice specific characteristics, and individual specific attributes but cannot observe or fail to 
measure other factors influencing choice, a probabilistic model based on random utility theory 
can be constructed to investigate the likelihood that an option will be selected. Accordingly, 
1tjt(j = 1 I w, M) = 1tit { Uijt > U;kt I M }  
= 1tit { u * > v I M }  
j :t:.  k;j, k E S 
[3] 
where 1t denotes the probability function, w represents choice variant and invariant 
characteristics, M denotes the information content in the survey, u* denotes difference in 
indirect utility between preferred state j and state k, v captures differences in error terms 
between states, and S denotes all states available to individual i. Equation [3] states that 
individual i will choose state j at time t if latent utility derived in this condition exceeds that in 
any other state k. For example, when deciding upon which forest amenity enhancement plan to 
support an individual evaluates several alternative plans but ultimately chooses only one. 
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Given that u * is unobservable, the mean and variance of u * are not identified and the 
researcher must impose a specific distribution to the error term. If we assume u to be 
independent and identically distributed over time for each individual and to follow a Type I 
extreme value distribution, then equation [3] can be empirically modeled by the multinomial 
logit model (MNL): 
[4] 
Elements in w that do not change across choices must be interacted with an alternative specific 
constant in order for the model to be identified. Subscript t is irrelevant in equation [4] since 
the MNL treats each choice made in each choice set as from separate individuals, even though 
the same individual made multiple discrete choices within a single survey. Estimates of J3 from 
the MNL are assumed known and constant across all survey respondents. Since this may not 
be the case such that J3 varies across the sample of respondents, a random parameters 
specification of the mixed logit representation of choice (equation [3]) may be more 
appropriate. Specifically, a panel specification of random parameters logit (PRPL) may be 
preferred in order to capture individual specific effects across choice sets. 
Within the PRPL framework, choice probabilities are based on the MNL probability 
function (equation [ 4]) yet account for multiple choice sets with index t and explicitly model 
the randomness of parameters throughout the sample via the mixing distribution f(J3 10). 
Accordingly, 
T 
rctRPL(j = I I w, M, t) = f I1 exp(h,J/3/ + Wj/fJ;} I r..Ss=lexp(hst'Pt + Wst'f3t)f(f3 1 O)d/3 [5] 
t =  1 
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where a specific distribution for f{PI9) is determined by the researcher, for example, normal, 
and e denotes parameters for the mean and covariance of the chosen distribution (Train 2003). 
Equation [ 5] states the probability a respondent will choose choice j across choice sets T is the 
product of multinomial logits integrated over all possible values of p. PRPL probabilities are 
computed numerically using simulation methods for specified values of e 
R T 
ntRPL(S)(j = I I w, M, t) = R-
J {2: n 1tjt(/Y)} 
r= I t= I 
[6] 
where R is the number of simulated draws. Simulation of equation [ 6] progresses by drawing a 
value of p from the mixing distribution f{PI9) in iteration r and estimating the multinomial 
logit component of equation [5] with this draw. The process is repeated for number of draws R 
with the average of such draws representing the simulated probability. By construction, 
ntRPL(SJ an unbiased estimator of ntRPL and has variance inversely related to R (Train 2003, p. 
148). Since ntRPL(SJ is strictly positive, the log of equation [6] exists which allows estimation 
of the simulated log likelihood function 
N K 
SLL = L 2: l;k lnntRPL(SJ 
i= I k= I 
[7] 
where I is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent chose k and zero otherwise. 
Parameters for p including a direct effect and standard deviation, which measures the 




with respect to p. Computed variances for each direct effect and standard deviation permit 
hypothesis testing of direct effects and fixed (constant) coefficient values for the sample. 
3. Survey and Data 
A multiple choice set, discrete trichotomous choice survey, or constructed market, 
designed accordingly to the choice modeling framework (Louviere et al. 2000) was used to 
assess public preferences for forest amenities. In particular, the goal of the survey was to 
evaluate the feasibility of developing a framework in which nonindustrial, private forest 
landowners would be compensated for managing their lands for improved forest amenities. 
Three thousand choice surveys were mailed to residents in Morgan and Cumberland counties, 
located on the Cumberland Plateau in central Tennessee. This location was selected because 
the Plateau provides a number of resource use conflicts between new residents, recreationists, 
and extractive industries such as mining and logging, that threaten the sustainability of the 
forest resource. Additionally, both counties are experiencing population growth rates 
exceeding the national average of 1 .3 percent (SSDAN 2000), with Cumberland experiencing 
an annual rate of 3 .4 percent and Morgan 1 .4 percent. In line with population growth, these 
counties have experienced increased conversion of forest and agricultural land to urban uses 
(Strickland 2003). Urbanization is not localized to our study area and has been found to be a 
primary driver for land use change throughout the South (Wear 2002). Due to increasing 
population and urbanization, which underlie present resource conflicts in our area, we found it 
relevant to investigate how public preferences for forest amenities might change if we 
informed residents of the possibility of further land use change. 
We introduced the constructed market to respondents through two cover letters and a 
survey, with the letters explaining to the respondent forest amenities, the role of private 
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landowners in forest amenity supply, and how the respondent's answers to questions in the 
survey could help improve future levels of forest amenities. Within the survey, this 
information was reiterated and new information was provided explaining the layout of the 
survey, payment vehicle, and policy relevance. We informed respondents that the survey was 
not a means to justify additional taxes or introduce new legislation but instead a way for us to 
gain a better understanding of public preferences and values for forest amenities in the area. 
The payment vehicle was specified as an annual, voluntary contribution for five years to a 
non-profit organization that would then use these donations to fund initiatives providing land 
management assistance to private landowners. 16 We presented the compensation mechanism 
as a means of helping landowners who manage their land do so in a manner that provides the 
most public benefits and for landowners that do not manage their land, the incentive to do so 
and in a socially desirable way. The extended time frame of five years, as opposed to the 
standard one or two years, was necessary to allow sufficient time for forests to respond to 
management activities. 
The layout of the survey included 5 choice sets with 3 generic (i.e., non-labeled) options 
within each set. These options were described to the respondent as alternative forest amenity 
enhancement plans a hypothetical, representative landowner in the study area would 
implement if compensated for doing so. If the respondent chose the status quo (Plan A), then 
the landowner would not manage her property for improved forest amenities and the stock of 
amenities would remain the same. However, if the respondent chose either forest amenity 
I 
enhancement Plan B or C then the landowner would implement the selected plan and use the 
16 To improve incentive compatibility, a payment vehicle such as a sales or property tax (Tennessee 
does not have an income tax) could have been applied. However, at the time of survey design and 
administration the Tennessee State Legislature approved a sales tax increase that resulted in some areas 
paying an approximate 10 percent sales tax on purchases. Due to the strong objections of residents 
toward this increase and the desire to have a reasonable response rate, we elected to use the less 




respondent's contributions to offset management expenses. In total, a respondent evaluated 1 1  
alternative forest amenity enhancement plans with each plan decomposed into 4 amenity 
attributes (recreational access, scenic beauty, stream quality, and wildlife habitat) and a 
voluntary contribution. The forest amenity attributes were assigned one of three quality levels, 
Low, Medium, or High, and in the case of the voluntary contribution, one of four levels ($20, 
$35, $50, $75), according to a fractional factorial design algorithm�(see Appendix A).17 The 
status quo was presented to the respondent as Low for recreation, scenic beauty, and wildlife 
habitat, Medium for stream quality, and zero contribution. We include a status quo option 
since forest amenities, as defined in the survey, will continue to be provided regardless of the 
program. Figure 2 provides an example choice set presented to survey respondents. 
In order to test the effect of information about future possible urbanization on public 
preferences and stated willingness to pay (WTP) for improved forest amenities, we designed 
two versions of the survey identical in all respects except the specification of the choice 
scenario. In the control version, the representative landowner is described to the respondent as 
owning 50 wooded acres comprised of both hardwood and evergreen tree species and several 
streams, approximately 10  miles from a major interstate ("no development" specification). In 
the experimental version, we describe the same landowner (50 acres, 10 miles from interstate) 
but introduce information that she has been approached by a residential developer to sell the 
land for a future subdivision. Additionally, we state that the representative landowner would 
forgo this development option if compensated for providing forest amenities. Thus, we 
exogenously alter the available information set and if the respondent reads and comprehends 
this new information then we should observe an effect on preferences and stated WTP, 
compared to the control. 
17 We identified quality levels by these simplistic terms after discovering through focus groups that 
more detailed quality level descriptions overloaded the respondent with information. Contribution 
levels are based on actual costs given in Dubois et al. (2001). 
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SCENARIO 1 
Note: Please refer to the Definitions page to clarify unfamiliar terms. 
Reminder: Choose one Option that has your favorite quality levels (in the middle) and the 
amount you are willing to pay. 
The "Annual Contribution" represents your willingness to pay annually for S years 
in the form of a voluntary contribution to fund the Option you select. 



















Please respond by checking ( ...J ) the option that you most agree with and 
that you can afford with your present budget: 
I prefer Option A I prefer Option B I prefer Option C 
Figure 2 
Example choice set from Forest Amenity Improvement Survey. 
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; 
Based on these two survey versions we conducted several focus groups and a pre-test 
mailing of 100 surveys. Principal findings from these meetings and initial surveys include the 
following: forest amenity attributes and quality levels were overspecified (too much 
descriptive information), too many choice sets (originally 7), and unreasonable maximum 
payment level ($320). After taking into consideration these findings, 2000 surveys were 
mailed to Cumberland County and 1 000 to Morgan County followi'ng a three-phase Dillman 
design (Dillman 2000). The first phase consisted of a short cover letter informing the potential 
respondent of the upcoming survey. One week following this letter, a full cover letter and 
survey were mailed; a post card reminder was sent two weeks post the second phase. A second 
mailing of the survey was not undertaken as we did not believe the expected increase in 
response rate would justify the additional cost. The unequal division in survey mailings across 
counties was due to prior knowledge of inadequate mailing address information in Morgan 
County. 18 All addresses were generated by random digit dialing procedures by Survey 
Sampling, Inc and used to georeference each respondent. 
Table 2 provides descriptions for variables adapted from the choice modeling instrument 
(see Appendix B for an overview of all survey questions). Most of the variables are standard 
to choice analysis with the exception of Knowledge and Plan Score. Knowledge is a measure 
of the respondent's perceived knowledge of forests and trees as measured by their choice of a 
score between zero and five, with five indicating complete knowledge and zero indicating no 
knowledge. We assume a direct relationship between increases in Knowledge and the 
probability a survey respondent will choose a forest amenity enhancement plan (option). The 
Knowledge question was presented to survey participants after evaluation of the choice sets. 
Plan Score is an aggregate index capturing the total effect of each enhancement plan in each 
1 8  We have also conducted a hedonic price analysis of housing prices and forest amenities in these 
two counties and found significant gaps in address information for Morgan County. A principal reason 
for this data gap is the lack of a well-developed 9 1 1  emergency response system. 
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Table 2 
Variable identification and descriptive statistics based on respondent answers to Forest 
Amenity lm�rovement Surve_y 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. , 
Demographic Variables 
Cumberland = 1 if respondent lives in Cumberland County; 0.753 0.43 1 
= 0 if Morgan County 
Land Size Median number of acres of forestland owned 9.7 1 8  19.814 
by respondent (derived from six land size 
categories ranging from zero to 100 acs or 
more) 
Attitudinal Variable 
Knowledge Respondent's selection to the following: "How 2.805 1 . 108 
would you rate, on a scale ofO to 5, your 
knowledge of forests and trees" 
Spatial(GIS/RS) Variable 
Forest Cover Natural log oftotal amount (m2 /1000) of 1 .501 1 .205 
deciduous and evergreen forest land cover 
within a 1OOm radius of each respondent 
Survey Design Variables 
Develop = 1 if Status Quo information contains 0.440 0.496 
Development option; = 0 ifNo Development 
option 
Plan Score Aggregate score for each forest amenity 2.069 1 .093 
enhancement plan (status quo Plan A and 
alternative Plans B and C) across choice sets 1 
through 5 presented to the respondent; log 
scores were calculated for each attribute level 
to avoid linearity assumptions and then 
summed across attributes for each option; 
score ranges from 0 (status quo) to 3.99 
(highest level of forest amenities) 
Contribution Annual dollar amount respondent is voluntarily 25.000 22. 1 38 
willing to contribute for five years for the 
enhancement plan chosen; ranges from 0 
(status quo) to $75; contribution amounts vary 
independently across respondents and assigned 
to each plan by the researcher according to 
actual cost of implementation 
Contribute ASC Alternative specific constant = 1 for both 0.667 0.471 
contribution options (i.e., forest amenity 





choice set on preferences. We indexed forest amenity attributes and associated quality levels 
due to high levels of multicollinearity. 19 The index was computed by first assigning order-
preserving values of one through three to quality levels Low, Medium, and High, respectively, 
and then summing these levels over all forest amenity attributes within each plan and choice 
set: 
A 
L qaJt = Plan Score11 [8] 
a= I 
where q denotes quality levels, a denotes forest amenity attributes (recreational access, scenic 
beauty, stream quality, or wildlife habitat), j indexes individual plans, and t indexes choice 
sets. Equation [8] represents a simple linear combination of attributes and attribute quality 
levels and implies the effect on respondent preferences of a change from quality level Low to 
Medium is equal to a change from Medium to High. In order to avoid this result we computed 
several transformations of equation [8] including quadratic, exponential, and logarithmic. 
Each of these transformations specifies a nonlinear relationship between respondent utility and 
increasing attribute quality levels, which yields a more theoretically consistent depiction of the 
importance of quality levels to a respondent. We employed each transformation in 
combination with the remaining regressors in the econometric analysis of choice and found the 
exponential transformation of Plan Score to be insignificant and the logarithmic 
transformation to provide the best model fit. 
19 The minimum and maximum Pearson correlation coefficients between any two attributes were 
0.04 and 0.94, respectively, with both mean and median value approximately 0.64. A complete matrix 
of correlation coefficients is available from the authors. The multicollinearity is a result of relaxing 
orthogonality between attributes and quality levels in the design phase. 
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4. Information Effect: Forest Cover 
Within the context of environmental valuation research, remotely sensed imagery and 
geographic information systems have been predominant in revealed preference studies 
(Bateman et al. 2002). Examples include Dubin (1988), Can ( 1992), Geoghegan et al. ( 1997), 
Mahan et al. (2000), and Kim et al. (2003) in the hedonic literature and Bateman et al. (1996) 
in the travel cost literature. The advantage of a spatial perspective is that it allows researchers 
to investigate the relationship between preferences and surrounding environmental conditions 
and how this relationship might change when conditions are altered. More importantly, 
welfare measures, such as compensating variation, are conditioned on preferences for 
environmental settings and failure to address this linkage may result in biased welfare 
estimates. This in turn would affect policy formation, choice, and evaluation. 
The constantly increasing computing capability, advancements in geographic information 
systems, and more readily available, high resolution remotely sensed imagery enable 
researchers to integrate spatial variables in valuation models. Stated preference research 
inherently involves a spatial perspective and until recently, has been ignored. Farber and 
Griner (2000) incorporate a distance measure with stated choices to investigate the influence 
of proximity to affected streams on willingness to pay for improvements to these streams. 
Results suggest stated willingness to pay decreases with increasing distance (implying a 
distance decay effect) for stream users while no such relationship exists for non-users. Their 
work represents the first study to incorporate a GIS derived variable in a choice modeling 
" 
context. In a contingent valuation study of protecting forests from increased flooding, 
Bateman et al. (2000) find a significant distance decay relationship between willingness to pay 
and respondent distance from the site under valuation.20 GIS and remote sensing, though, 
20 Sutherland and Walsh (1985) and Pate and Loomis (1997) each find a significant distance decay 
relationship between stated willingness to pay solicited in contingent valuation experiments and 
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provide for more advanced treatment of space in valuation models than simple distance 
measures, as indicated by the aforementioned hedonic pricing studies. In the spirit of the 
advancements made in revealed preference research, we explore the role of forest land cover 
on preferences and willingness to pay using a methodology similar to Geoghegan et al. (1997). 
Unlike states such as Maryland, the state of Tennessee has not yet developed a 
comprehensive, digital land cover classification. Thus, we developed a 12-class land cover 
classification for the Cumberland Plateau using Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics satellite 
imagery (30-m resolution) provided by the USGS, digital orthophoto quadrangles (resampled 
to 1m resolution), and the GIS Imagine. Digital data were supplemented with ground data 
collected throughout the study area to facilitate pixel classification and accuracy assessment. 
The general process involved a series of supervised classifications based on 400 individual 
signatures with an overall accuracy of approximately 90 percent (see Strickland 2003 for a 
complete methodological review). Survey responses were linked to the land cover 
classification by first geocoding each respondent's address. We then developed a program in 
the Arclnfo macro language to place a l OOm buffer around each respondent's geocoded 
location, intersect this buffer with the land cover classification, and then sum over all 
categories. Finally, the category for forest land cover was selected for further analysis with the 
respondent's stated choices, demographics, and attitudinal responses (see Table 2 for variable 
description and descriptive statistics). We hypothesize that the amount of forest land cover 
around a respondent does influence choice, thus we should observe a significant parameter 
estimate for the variable Forest Cover. 
distance to the valued good. However, in the former study GIS was not applied in distance calculations 
and in the latter no reference was made to the derivation of their distance measures. 
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5. Information Effect: Land Use Change 
The random utility model specified in equations [32] through [34] provides a framework 
for exploring the conditional probability an individual will choose one of the forest amenity 
enhancement options described in the constructed market. Specifically, we are interested in 
the effect of information concerning the possibility of land use change from forest to 
residential.21 The information provided to a respondent may not affect choice for several 
reasons: he/she did not read or understand the choice scenario, has preconceived views that are 
unaltered by new information, or believes the information to be erroneous and thus ignores it. 
When information is neutralized, we would expect the probability of choice to be independent 
of the information content in the survey such that Jt(j = 1 I N) =  rf(i = 1 I D) = 1t(j = 1), where 
N denotes the no development scenario information and D the development information. 
However, theory and applied research shows that the probability of choice is conditioned on 
information such that the equality does not hold (see Munro and Hanley 1 999). 
This result gives rise to four possible outcomes that are contingent on both the level of 
information and the respondent's held beliefs. To explore these four cases, two separate 
random utility models with an expected utility dimension were specified: 
Jt(j = 1 I w; N) = rt{  v(y - C, e, I, z)' + E' > v(y, e, I, z)Q + EQ I N } [9] 
and 
I 
rf(i = 1 lw; D) =  rt{v(y - C, e, I, z)' + �>' > o[v(y, e, I, z)Q + E� + 9[v(y, e, I, z)v + Ev] ID} [10] 
21 It is possible that the development information had the effect of creating two separate goods -
forest amenities without development pressure and forest amenities with development pressure, instead 
of an information effect. A debriefing question was not included in the survey to help distinguish 
between the two potential types of effects, thus we cannot be sure of the dominant effect this 




where j denotes a forest amenity enhancement option (Plan B or C), C denotes positive 
contribution to the forest amenity program, 1>'(. )' indicates indirect utility derived from a forest 
amenity enhancement option, v(.)Q represents indirect utility from the status quo, v(f 
represents indirect utility given the development information, 8 and 9 are individual specific 
measures of risk with (1  - 8) = 9 and 0 < 8 < 1 ,  and individual and time subscripts suppressed 
for notational convenience. Equation [9] does not include the additional component included 
on the right hand side of equation [10] because under the no development specification, there 
is no other land use to consider. For the following cases, assume the perspective that an 
individual is responding to the development specification, that is, equation [10].  
CASE / 
If the respondent does not prefer residential development, then v(. )D represents the 
disutility an individual derives from the change and v(.)Q > v(f. Thus, the probability of 
choosing a forest amenity enhancement option will be greater under the development than no 
development information; we expect to observe a higher proportion of choices for an 
enhancement option from the development compared to no development responses. The 
testable null hypothesis is H1: rrf>(j = 1 I w; D) > rc"(j = 1 I w; N). This outcome is not sensitive 
to the value given 8, but an interesting analysis arises under different risk assumptions. For 
more risk averse respondents, 9 > 8 implying more weight assigned to the unfavorable 
outcome development, we would expect to observe a greater proportion of choices for the 
enhancement option than if respondents were risk inclined (8 > 9). If our survey had been 
designed to measure individual risk behavior, we could have stratified the analysis of choice 
and scenario specification by attitude toward risk to test these expectations. 
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CASE II 
In contrast to CASE I, it is reasonable to· believe that some individuals will perceive 
development as a positive alternative land use due to the potential welfare improving impacts 
of increased labor demand for home construction, increased property tax revenue, 
opportunities for business development, etc. That is, respondents would view residential use 
of the land as the highest valued and best use. In this case, v(f > v(.)Q, reflecting the utility an 
individual gains from the knowledge that the area will be converted to residential use. 
Accordingly, we expect to observe a lower frequency of choices for a forest amenity 
enhancement option with the development specification of the status quo over the no 
development specification. The null hypothesis is HII: Jt(j = 1 I w; N) > rr?(j = 1 I w; D). As 
before, specific values for o would only change the distribution of choices and not the overall 
outcome. 
CASE lli 
Respondents may not prefer to see the land use change from forest to residential but at the 
same time perceive forests to be unsafe because, for example, of a potential wildfire threat.22 
Consequently, they are indifferent to the development information in the description of the 
choice scenario. In this case, v(.)Q = v(.)D and regardless of risk behavior v(.)Q + FP = o[v(.)Q + 
EQ ] + 9[v(.)D + E� holds. Thus, we would expect to observe identical proportions of choices 
across the two scenario specifications with null hypothesis Hm: rr?(j = 0 I w; D) = Jt(j = 0 I w; 
N), wherej equal to zero indicates choice of the baseline or status quo (i.e., Plan A). 
I 
22 Aggregating across both survey versions, 60 respondents ( 16% of total) stated that wildfire was 
the most significant threat to the future of Tennessee forests (as compared to urban/commercial 





Last, if respondents prefer the status quo regardless of the information given in the scenario 
specification then v(.)v = 0 (or o =  1) and v(.)Q > v(.)' in both equations [9] and [10] .  This 
result implies that in either information setting respondents will choose the status quo option 
more frequently than a forest amenity enhancement option. Thus, the null hypothesis is H/1/: 
�,N(j = 0 I w; M) > �,N(j = 1 I w; M). 
While Cases II through IV are immediately solved by the result for Case I, the contingency 
table applied in the analysis of I (Table 3) offers interesting insight into these potential 
outcomes. As an econometric test of an information effect, we tested the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient for dichotomous variable Develop (f3v) is not significantly different from zero 
(indicating no effect). The alternative hypothesis is that the development information will be 
perceived as negative by respondents and serve as an incentive to choose a forest amenity 
enhancement option (i.e., Case n. Accordingly, we expect to observe f3v > 0. Finally, we 
derived estimates of compensating variation to test whether respondent stated willingness to 
pay is different between the development and no development information specifications of 
the choice scenario. The testable hypothesis is Ha: cVV > cJI'I. 
6. Results 
6. 1. Survey Respondents 
Of the 3000 surveys mailed across 2 counties, 372 useable surveys were returned with 122 
undeliverables, yielding a response rate of approximately 13  percent. While this rate is low 
compared to more traditional contingent valuation exercises it is within the range reported by 
previous studies employing a similar multiple choice set, choice modeling approach 
(Adamowicz et al. 1994, Farber and Griner 2000). Thirty percent of all choices (N = 1 860) 
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Table 3 
Conditional independence tests for choice by specification of choice scenario and land 
ownership a 
Choice 




Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel x2( df = 1 )" 
Land Ownership 
9.21 *  
345 (33%)b 
216 (26%) 
Less than 5 ac 380 (28%) 
More than 5 ac 1 8 1  (37%) 







• Conditional testing was also conducted by stratifying by county, gender, and land ownership with qualitative 
results consistent with those reported. 
b Percentages in parentheses are calculated by dividing each cell value by its respective row total. 
c Testing H0: No association between specification and choice; • indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
were for the status quo (Plan A) payment level of zero, 23 percent for contribution amount 
$20, 29 percent for contribution amount $35, and the residual 1 1  and 7 percent for 
contribution amounts $50 and $75, respectively. Qualitatively, these results suggest that there 
is not a spike at either end of the contribution distributio!} and thus protest and yea-saying 
effects should be minimal. Analysis by county shows that Cumberland County recorded the 
greatest number of returned surveys with 279, representing 1395 individual choices, and 
Morgan County recorded 93 returned surveys with 465 choices. Relative to the number of 
surveys mailed to each county, Cumberland County reported a 14 percent response rate and 9 
percent for Morgan County. The lower response rate for Morgan County was expected given 
its more rural status and may lead to a response bias in subsequent econometric modeling. A 
check for possible nonresponse bias was conducted via a short telephone interview with 100 
randomly selected survey nonrespondents. Qualitative analysis of these results shows that on 




approximately an equal amount of land, yet were less educated and held lower household 
income when compared to respondents.23 Thus, a potential response bias may be evident in the 
data. 
Table 3 provides a contingency table of respondent choices by specification of the choice 
scenario. Analysis reveals that 67 percent (n12 = 700) and 74 percent (n22 = 599) of choices 
from the no development and development survey versions, respectively, were for one of the 
alternative forest amenity enhancement plans (i.e., non-zero contributions). Based on a 
Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel chi-square test of conditional independence between choice and 
specification of the choice scenario, the null hypothesis of no association was firmly rejected 
(p-value < 0.001). Thus, Case I in Section 3 represents the behavior of respondents to the 
development information. That is, respondents to the development specification of the choice 
scenario viewed this information negatively, or received disutility from the potential land use 
change, which then corresponded to a higher frequency of choices for an alternative to the 
status quo. As mentioned earlier, the result for Case I provides an immediate solution to Cases 
II through N but further analysis of Table 3 reveals that a significantly lower proportion of 
zero contributions were stated by respondents given the development survey version (see Case 
III). Overall, these results indicate the significant influence researchers can have on 
respondent preferences and stated choices by simply altering the information set provided in 
constructed markets. 
23 In total, 53 1 nonrespondents were randomly selected for the telephone administered nonresponse 
analysis. However, due to a variety of reasons, namely immediate refusal to participate in the telephone 
survey, only 100 surveys were completed. The most frequently reported reasons for not responding to 
the mail survey included: participants did not feel qualified to complete the survey (n = 16) and had no 
interest in forest amenities (n = 1 8). Least frequently reported reasons included budget constraints (n = 
7) and survey was too long and complicated (n = 8). As a note, nearly two thirds of surveyed 
nonrespondents resided in Morgan County while for the sample of mail survey respondents three 
fourths resided in Cumberland County. A copy of the nonresponse interview form and complete 
analysis of the nonresponse component of this study are available from the authors. 
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6.2. Econometric Analysis 
Results of multinomial logit (MNL) and panel random parameters (PRPL) model 
estimation of the pooled 372 completed surveys representing 1860 options chosen and 3720 
options not chosen are listed in Table 4.24 Since the PRPL model estimates the probability an 
individual will choose one of the forest amenity enhancement options (Option B or C) for each 
alternative, all of the information in the sample is applied in estimation. Accordingly, 5580 
observations are applied in ML and only 1 860 in MNL estimation. We present the results of a 
MNL model to illustrate the significant differences in preference modeling that can result if an 
inappropriate econometric model is applied to panel data generated within a discrete choice 
framework. As can be readily seen, all variables were significant and have one directional 
impact on the probability of choice in the MNL model while only 3 variables were significant 
and of one direction in the PRPL model. The policy implications of these inconsistencies are 
apparent and highlight the importance of searching out the most appropriate econometric 
representation of choice. The model fit is also greatly improved by modeling choice with the 
panel random parameters logit model, as indicated by the more positive log likelihood value 
and substantially higher value of McFadden's R2• We apply results from the PRPL model for 
further analysis. 
Similar to Revelt and Train (1998) and Train ( 1998), we believed certain variables would 
not explain choice independent of the others. Empirical model testing revealed that the 
coefficient for Contribution Amount was highly correlated with several variables, namely Plan 
• 
Score. Logically, these two variables should move in a similar direction as it is infeasible to 
achieve a higher level of forest amenities without increasing the cost of provision. In order to 
24 A likelihood ratio test was conducted to test parameter (and preference) equality of respondents 
across the two survey versions. The null hypothesis H0: -/' = of  was not rejected at any level (where y is 
the vector of estimated parameters from the no development (N) and development (D) only samples; 





Multinomial logit and panel random parameters (PRP) logit model coefficients for choice 
among forest amenity enhancement options 
Multinomial Logit PRP Logit (Corr. Coeff.t 
Variable Coeff. Coeff. 
Demographic Variables 
Cumberland 0.552 -3.37 1 
(4.524)b ( 1 .200) 
Land Size -0.01 1  -0.005 
(-4. 198) (-0.044) 
Attitudinal Variable 
Knowledge 0.244 0.836 
(5. 148) (2.06) 
Spatial (GIS/RS) Variable 
Forest Cover -0. 1 10 -0.251 
(-2.098) (-0.455) 
Survey Design Variables 
Develop 0.45 1 0.7 17  
(4. 143) (0.642) 
Plan Score 0.506* 0.573 
(6.594) (3 .347) 
Contribution -0.025 -0.045 
(-9.208) (-13 .470) 
Contribute ASC -0.923 4.252 
(-3 .948) (1 .253) 


















Chi-square (df) 185.04 (8) 872.62 (38) 
McFadden's R2 0.05 0.21 
N d  1 ,850 5,580 
• Based on I 000 Halton sequences; normal distribution is specified for all coefficients; estimated in Limdep. 
b Asymptotic /-statistic in parentheses. 
c Simulated log likelihood value at convergence. 
d Ten observations with missing information. 
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account for this interaction and other correlated variables, we report results of the PRPL 
specification with correlated coefficients. The PRPL model allows for multiple choices per 
person, yet spatial, attitudinal, and demographic attributes of each person remain constant , 
across choices. In order for the model to be identified, these variables were interacted with 
Contribute ASC. All of the interaction terms except Cumberland were found to significantly 
influence choice and only Knowledge was found to have a one-directional impact on choice 
(Table 4 ). The coefficient for Knowledge is positive indicating perceived knowledge of forests 
and trees, and presumably, forest amenities, has a positive influence on the probability a forest 
amenity enhancement plan will be chosen. The insignificance of the standard deviation of 
Knowledge indicates this result held for all respondents. The marginal effect for Knowledge 
was also positive and implies that increasing perceived knowledge by one level increases the 
probability an enhancement plan will be chosen by 44 percent (see Table 5). These results 
suggest through improved education and outreach efforts (i.e., extension) residents in the 
study area may be more willing to support land management efforts that lead to improved 
forest amenities. If support did increase, landowners might have a viable alternative to 
preserve or enhance their forested holdings in the face of increasing development pressures. 
Restricting attention to the coefficient column of the panel random parameters logit model, 
the insignificance of the mean coefficient value for Forest Cover suggests that there is no 
spatial information effect. However, since the PRPL model explicitly incorporates in 
estimation the randomness of the coefficient throughout the sample, measured by the 
; 
coefficient's standard deviation, we fmd that the amount of forest land cover surrounding 
survey respondents does significantly influence their choice. A reason for the lack of 
significance in mean coefficient value for Forest Cover is the countervailing effects of the 




Coefficient distribution and marginal effectsa 
Variable Distributionb Marginal Effectsc 
Land Size (5 1 -, 49 +) N.A. 
Knowledge N.A. 0.439 
Forest Cover (54 -, 46 +) N.A. 
Develop (46 -, 54 +) N.A. 
Plan Score (27 -, 73 +) 0.283 
Contribution (0 -, 100 +) -0.268 
Contribute ASC (37 -, 63 +) � N.A. 
• Based on coefficients from the panel random parameters logit model in Table 4. Notation N.A. pertains to 
coefficients that do not vary throughout the population (Knowledge) or do not have a significant mean parameter 
estimate (Land Size, Forest Cover, Develop, and Contribute ASC). 
b The negative sign following the first value in each parentheses indicates the percent, or share, of respondents for 
whom the coefficient has a negative effect on the predicted probability of choosing a forest amenity enhancement 
option. Similarly, a positive sign indicates a positive effect on predicted probabilities. The distribution for each 
coefficient is calculated by constructing a standard normal deviate with the coefficient value and its respective 
standard deviation and then computing the probability of finding a value greater than the result (assuming standard 
normal distribution). 
c Each marginal and partial effect measures the change in the probability an individual will choose one of the forest 
amenity enhancement plans (Plan B or C) given a change in the respective variable. Marginal effects are computed 
for each respondent and then averaged. We report the estimates for Plan C, which are nearly identical to those for 
Plan B. 
forest cover negatively influenced their decision to choose a forest amenity enhancement plan 
while the influence was positive for 46 percent (Table 5). Based on respondent comments to 
the survey and the fact that the mean number of forested acres owned by respondents was 
approximately 10 while only 26 percent were landowners, the negative influence is driven by 
landowners in general and specifically, owners who would not manage their land for improved 
forest amenities if given the option. In order to statistically test this hypothesis we constructed 
an indicator variable separating landowners (Land Size > 5 ac) and non-landowners and then 
analyzed the frequency of choice by ownership category (Table 3). Similar to the earlier test 
of conditional independence for respondent choice by specification of the scenario, the results 
reveal significant association between forestland ownership and choice. The evidence against 
the null hypothesis of no association suggests landowners are less likely to choose a forest 
amenity enhancement option and more likely to choose the status quo compared to non-
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landowners.25 Since forest landowners are surrounded by more forest land cover than non-
landowners, we can tentatively conclude that responding landowners control the sign and 
distribution of the Forest Cover coefficient. Thus, a one directional affect cannot be 
determined and more weight lies in the negative tail of the distribution for Forest Cover. 
The results for the coefficient distribution of Land Size nearly mirror those of Forest Cover 
and provide further evidence that owning land is a negative factor in the decision to contribute 
to improved forest amenities. For 5 1  percent of respondents, owning more land negatively 
influenced their choice of a forest amenity enhancement plan. However, by identifying and 
investigating the 49 percent of respondents for which land ownership positively influenced 
choice we may be able to identify a common set of factors that explain the relationship. 
Incorporation of this information in extension programs to landowners could improve the 
effectiveness of such programs and potentially increase landowner support for improving 
forest amenities. 
The insignificant mean value and significant standard deviation for the Develop coefficient 
indicates that land use change information does affect respondent preferences and stated 
choices but not in a one directional manner. The new information was perceived as a potential 
detrimental outcome and served as an incentive to choose a forest amenity enhancement plan 
for 54 percent of respondents (supporting Case 1). However, for the residual 46 percent the 
new information was perceived as providing potential positive benefits and thereby served as a 
disincentive to choose an enhancement plan (Case II). The distribution of the Develop 
• 
coefficient provides evidence in support of the aspatial information effects hypothesis (Ha: f3v 
> 0), yet the large proportion of respondents for whom the information was perceived in a 
25 Landowners could have tended to choose the status quo more often than one of the forest amenity 
enhancement options because they already have a sufficient level of forest amenities. Thus, they are 
content with the status quo. The general result of choosing the status quo, though, does not exclude the 




positive light precludes broad generalization. Referring back to earlier discussion of the 
multinomial and panel random parameters logit models, if the MNL was the sole econometric 
model for analyzing choice we would have concluded strongly in favor of the hypothesis Ha: 
f3n > 0. This result, while generally in the right direction, would have implied that all 
respondents assign identical weight to the land use change information. The information 
gained from estimating PRPL models minimizes such generalized" and possibly inaccurate 
conclusions. 
The mean coefficient value for the variable measuring influence of aggregate forest 
amenity enhancement quality (Plan Score) on respondent preferences is highly significant and 
positive indicating that forest amenities collectively have a positive affect on choice. 
Additionally, the standard deviation is highly significant with the overwhelming majority of 
respondents (73 percent) preferring improved forest amenities. The marginal effect for Plan 
Score indicates that a one unit increase in the aggregate level of amenities increases the 
probability of choosing an enhancement plan by 27 percent. These results imply respondents 
prefer forest amenities and are willing to contribute to improve amenity supply. Comparison 
of the coefficient distribution for Plan Score and respondent land ownership yields an 
interesting correspondence between the number of responding landowners (98 or 26 percent) 
and the 27 percent of respondents for whom forest amenities had a negative affect on choice. 
This correspondence suggests that while the minority of survey respondents are landowners, 
they collectively control the physical supply of forest amenities (and coefficient distribution of 
Forest Cover) and are generally not in favor of undertaking management activities to improve 
them. A disconnect is clearly present between demand, represented by respondents that 
support enhanced forest amenities, and supply. Progress toward the improvement of forest 
amenities is contingent upon resolution of this issue, which in turn depends on increasing 
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landowner knowledge of forest amenity benefits and development of additional compensation 
mechanisms. 
The negative and highly significant mean coefficient for Contribution accords with 
expectations and indicates that forest amenities are a normal good. Moreover, as expected 
increases in contribution levels negatively influenced the choice of a forest amenity 
enhancement plan for all survey respondents?6 However, an increase in Contribution has the 
smallest marginal effect (in absolute value) on the probability a respondent will choose a 
forest amenity enhancement plan. The mean value of the coefficient for the alternative specific 
constant Contribute ASC is insignificant but the standard deviation is highly significant. The 
coefficient distribution for Contribute ASC implies that the majority of respondents (63 
percent) have strong underlying preferences for an enhancement plan (Plan B or C) while only 
37 percent prefer the status quo (Plan A). 
7. Implications and Conclusions 
The results of econometric modeling of respondent choice between forest amenity 
enhancement plans reveal the ability of researchers to influence preferences and ultimately, 
choice in constructed markets. It follows that if choice is conditional on market framing then 
stated willingness to pay should be as well. If WTP varied in predictable patterns based on 
changes in framing, then researchers and policy makers could account on an ad hoc basis for 
new information that came forward after the constructed market was administered or for 
; 
mistakes in the original design by simply adjusting the results accordingly. However, WTP 
does not vary systematically and the direction of influence a researcher has on respondent 
preferences and choices can vary through the sample such that quantifying an adjustment 
26 Given that the sign of Contribution was negative for all respondents, we re-estimated the PRPL 
model with Contribution specified to follow a lognormal distribution. Estimation results between the 
two models are qualitatively similar. 
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factor would be complicated at best. Thus, information effects on choice and stated 
willingness to pay should be assessed on a case by case basis. In this study, we extend earlier 
findings of spatial and aspatial information effects to evaluate whether stated willingness to 
pay is influenced by new information and the amount of forest land cover surrounding a 
respondent as well as the specification of the econometric mode1.27 
For the aspatial information effect, we compared differences in "stated willingness to pay 
across choice scenario specifications for a policy change that involved an improvement in the 
current level of forest amenities from the status quo (Plan Score = 0) to a moderate level of 
provision (Plan Score = 2). WTP estimates for these two policy scenarios are based on 
estimated parameters from the multinomial (MNL) and correlated coefficients, panel random 
parameters logit (PRPL) models. Despite theoretical and mathematical differences between 
the two logit models the same equation is applied for calculating changes in WTP (Train 1998, 
p. 236). Accordingly, the change in willingness to pay for an improvement from the status quo 
level of forest amenities qo to q •, holding utility and all other factors constant, is given by: 
cv = -11 Pcontribute (y I X0 - r I X) [ 1 1 ]  
where CV i s  the Hicksian welfare measure, x i s  a vector that includes both choice variant and 
invariant attributes, superscript o denotes the status quo, the asterisk denotes the improved 
level, and y is a conformable vector of estimated parameters. The estimation of CV by 
econometric model and choice scenario gives rise to four welfare estimates for the proposed 
policy changes. Controlling for information effects, Hicksian welfare estimates of $25.53 and 
$39.7 1 ,  based on PRPL and MNL coefficients, respectively, result from increasing forest 
27 For this section of the analysis, we are interested in the magnitude as opposed to exact willingness 
to pay for improved forest amenities. 
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amenities to a moderate level (Table 6).Z8 However, evaluating the same policy change but 
accounting for a situation where new information about possible future residential 
development is introduced into the constructed market yields Hicksian welfare estimates of 
$41 .50 (PRPL) and $57.42 (MNL). A statistical comparison of these four estimates shows that 
the new information significantly increases CV both within and across model specifications 
with the MNL model consistently yielding higher estimates (Table 6). Thus, researchers can 
influence preferences, choices, and willingness to pay for environmental improvements 
solicited in choice modeling based questionnaires. Furthermore, econometric model 
misspecification can result in significant differences in estimated welfare impacts of 
alternative policies. 
The test for differences in estimated Hicksian welfare values for the spatial information 
effects hypothesis was conducted by specifying the same policy change (Plan Score 0 to 2) 
but assuming a five percent reduction in mean forest cover. We based this reduction on a land 
use change analysis of our study area (Strickland 2003) that predicts 10  percent conversion of 
all forested areas to developed uses between year 2000 and 2010. Assuming a uniform 
conversion rate over the sampled time period ( 10  years), total forest loss during the 5 year 
time horizon for contributing to improved forest amenities, as specified in the survey, would 
approximate 5 percent. Incorporating this reduction into the proposed policy change yields 
Hicksian welfare estimates of $41 .34 (MNL) and $27.64 (PRPL) (Table 6). These estimates 
are only $ 1 .63 and $2. 1 1  higher than similar estimates for a policy change with no 
" 
accompanying forest conversion. The closeness of these values to each other and zero 
suggests that spatial information in the form of forest loss does not significantly change 
individual willingness to pay for improved forest amenities. However, this result is more than 
28 As a note, given the insignificance of the mean coefficient value and standard deviation of county 
residence indicator Cumberland there should be no county-induced response bias on any of the 




Hicksian welfare estimates by econometric model and policy scenario for improved forest 
amenitiesa 
Policy Scenariob 
Aspatial Information Effect 
Develop = 0 (or 1) 
Develop = 0 vs. Develop = 1 
Spatial Information Effect 




($27.48, $5 1 .94)" 
$57.42* 
($39.69, $75 . 16) 
$41 .34* 
($28.88, $53.79) 
Panel random parameters 
logit coefficients 
$25.53* 




($20.5 1 '  $34. 77) 
• * indicates rejection at the 99 percent confidence level of Ho: CV; = CJj, where i and} (i * j) index estimated 
Hicksian welfare estimates, based on an asymptotic t test and the standard normal distribution. Hypothesis tests 
were not conducted across information effects. 
b The same policy change of an increase in Plan Score from the status quo level of 0 to a moderate provision level 
2 is specified for each set of welfare estimates. In the first set, the welfare estimates are invariant to the information 
effects dummy since all other factors remain constant except Plan Score. 
c 95 percent confidence intervals calculated by the delta method (Greene 2000, p. 70). 
likely driven by the proportion of responding forest landowners, who have greater mean levels 
of forest cover around their residences than non-landowners and generally prefer the status 
quo (and associated $0 contribution amount). If this is the case, then an alternative 
interpretation of the low welfare estimates could be it is not the additional willingness to pay 
that should interest policy makers or forest managers but instead the number of potential new 
contributors. That is, individuals who transition over time from rural to urban as a 
consequence ofland use change. 
In summary, this study combined spatial data collected from geographic information 
systems and remotely sensed imagery and aspatial data from a choice modeling based 
constructed market to investigate information effects on stated preferences for forest amenity 
improvements. The results show that researchers can influence preferences and 
correspondingly, choice and willingness to pay, by altering the circumstances in which 
preferences are formed, choices are made, and WTP is stated. However, in both cases of 
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information effects the direction of impact was not one-directional in that for a proportion of 
participants influence was positive and negative for the others. This result is provided by 
random parameters logit estimation of choice yet masked by multinomial logit estimation. , 
Information about future potential land use change served as an additional incentive to 
contribute to improved forest amenities by the majority of respondents. The high number of 
respondents for which development was seen as a negative incentive to contribute reflects 
strong preferences for the benefits associated with urban development. Thus, the future of a 
program promoting improved forest amenity management will involve educating residents of 
the benefits of forest amenities and tradeoffs associated with development. 
This study also found that the amount of forest land cover surrounding survey respondents 
influences choice for improved forest amenities. The uniqueness of this finding is that to date 
no other published study has incorporated spatial land cover information in a stated choice 
framework. The addition of a spatial variable allowed us to uncover interesting results relating 
increases in urbanization to potential increases in respondents willing to contribute to improve 
forest amenities as well as relating forestland ownership to preferences for the status quo level 
of amenities. These results support earlier findings that suggest a significant disconnect 
between forest amenity demand and supply. Increasing forestry knowledge for both 
landowners and non-landowners may be a promising means for aligning the disparate 
interests. Future research can build on these findings by investigating the effect of less subtle 
changes in market framing, incorporating additional land cover classes in the participant's 
• 
information set, and applying nonlinear probability models that explicitly incorporate 
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Toward Valuing Anthropogenic Impacts and Ecological Relationships in 
Forested Wetlands Using Spatial Econometric Models 
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, 
This chapter is a slightly revised version of a paper by the same name submitted to the Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management in 2004 by Aaron R. Wells, Aaron R. Pierce, 
and Donald G. Hodges. My use of the word "we" in this chapter refers to my co-authors and 
myself. My primary contributions to this paper include (1)  development of the problem into a 
work relevant to my study of environmental valuation, (2) development of the implicit 
valuation model, (3) incorporation of geographic information systems, ( 4) most of the 
gathering and interpretation of the literature, (5) econometric models, (6) most of the analysis, 
and (7) most of the writing . . . . . .  . 
Abstract 
This study presents economic values for specific ecological relationships and negative 
externalities associated with channelization that affect the productivity and overall market 
value of forested wetlands. To estimate these values, we develop and apply a spatial theoretic, 
implicit valuation model to microlevel ecological data in the Hatchie River Watershed, USA. 
Several functional forms for both the model and underlying spatial dependence are applied in 
nonparametric spatial econometric estimation of the valuation model. The results of robust, 
generalized moments estimation of double logarithmic spatial autoregressive error models 
(spatial dependence up to 1500m) indicate that the implicit cost of damages to forested 
wetlands caused by channelization is -$5,438 ha-1 • Results presented here are subject to the 
usual disclaimer of being site specific and temporally sensitive, thus future research 
investigating additional variables across differing forested wetland conditions and periods is 
recommended in order to bring legitimacy to the proposed valuation model. 
Keywords: Forested wetlands; Channelization; Implicit valuation; Spatial interaction 
1.  Introduction 
The ecology of forested wetlands, or bottomland hardwood forests, has been researched 
extensively (Happ et al. 1940, Shelford 1954, Hosner 1960, Keeley 1979, Clark and 
95 
Benforado 1981 ,  Wharton et al. 1982, Elder 1985, Gosselink et al. 1990, Kellison and Young 
1997, Mitsch and Gosse link 2000). Research in these areas has provided valuable information 
toward appreciating and understanding the complex functions and values forested wetlands , 
provide such as water quality enhancement, nutrient transformation, flood abatement, wildlife 
habitat, recreation, aesthetics, and wood products. Similarly, research has furthered the state of 
knowledge regarding anthropogenic impacts, primarily, agricultural development, timber 
harvesting, and hydrologic modifications such as channelization, on the ecological functioning 
of forested wetlands (Heitmeyer and Fredrickson 198 1 ,  Hupp and Simon 1991 ,  Hunter et al. 
1993, Hoover and Kilgore 1997, Lockaby et al. 1997, Perison et al. 1997). However, 
economic analysis of damages to and benefits of these ecosystems has been pursued to a lesser 
extent. 
The objective of this paper is to introduce a framework for estimating the economic value 
of attributes affecting productivity and market value of forested wetlands in the Hatchie River 
Watershed, USA. Specifically, we employ spatial econometric procedures and a hedonic-type 
model to develop a set of implicit prices for the negative externalities associated with 
channelization and excessive sedimentation. Additionally, we empirically explore 
fundamental ecological relationships between the value of a forested wetland and its location. 
The appeal of the model we present is that it is spatial theoretic, based on a limited number of 
plausible assumptions, and capable of valuing cumulative damages to forested wetlands. To 
date, this damage valuation model and corresponding empirical methods have not been 
; 
applied to the economic analysis of forested wetlands. Previous research has focused instead 
on the economic value that wetlands in general provide to society using aspatial econometric 
techniques or have applied nonmarket valuation methods for more site-specific valuation 
purposes (Kaxmierczak 2001 ,  Woodward and Wui 2001 ). While this research helps to 
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demonstrate the dependence of society on these unique ecosystems, and more importantly, 
draw attention to the significance of a diminishing supply, it does not address cumulative 
damages or specific factors affecting wetland functioning on any relevant temporal and 
watershed scale. 
Alternative valuation methodologies that have been used to estimate damages to wetlands 
include individual service valuation (Hickman 1990), net factor incofne, replacement cost, and 
energy analysis approaches as well as nonmarket techniques.29 The individual service 
valuation approach assumes that the value of a wetland can be determined by first subdividing 
the system into multiple, noncompetitive market-based services. For example, the benefits of 
employment and higher property values associated with fishery habitat and flood abatement 
services. The benefits of these services are then aggregated to derive the total economic value 
of the wetland. Problems with the individual service valuation approach include potential 
double counting of service benefits, focus on market as opposed to ecological benefits, and 
aggregation. Despite these problems, several valuation studies have been conducted on the 
basis of this method (Thibodeau and Ostro 1981 ,  Thomas et al. 1981 ,  Costanza et al. 1989, 
Whitehead and Blomquist 1991 ,  Gren et al. 1995). Wetland valuation based on the net factor 
income approach relies on a direct relationship between the aerial extent of a wetland and firm 
profit or productivity. Increases in wetland acreage are assumed to result in increased firm 
profit, and benefiting firms are expected to be willing to pay for improved wetland services in 
order to secure this additional profit. The problem with the net factor income method is that it 
can only be used to measure the use values of a wetland in terms of its relationship to firm 
productivity (Whitehead 1990). The replacement cost method of wetland valuation simply 
29 Most of the published research in this area has focused on wetlands in general and not on forested 
wetlands in particular. Thus, emphasis is placed on wetlands valuation. Additionally, alternative 
valuation methods have been applied to wetlands, such as the value estimator model (Bergstrom and 
Stoll 1 993) and the opportunity cost of forgone development (Batie and Mabbs-Zeno 1985), but are not 
discussed in detail here. 
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measures the value of wetland services as the economic cost of the least expensive alternative 
capable of achieving the same services (Bystrom 2000, Woodward and Wui 2001 ). A problem 
with this method is finding an alternative that can adequately replicate the services provided , 
by the existing wetland resource and then gaining societal and/or (potential) damager approval 
of said alternative. Lastly, the energy analysis approach to wetland valuation assumes an 
ecological economic perspective in that the value of a wetland is reflected in the total work 
accomplished by the wetland for society (Gosselink et al. 1974, Farber and Costanza 1987, 
Costanza et al. 1989). The usefulness of this method is limited by a number of significant 
assumptions, notably, the sole value of the wetland is its energy content. 
In contrast to the market and ecosystem perspectives of the above methods, nonmarket 
valuation techniques are based on the values individual economic agents hold for wetlands. 
Revealed preference nonmarket techniques, such as hedonic pricing and travel cost, are used 
to econometrically estimate the value of a wetland by relying on an indirect relationship 
between the wetland and individual transactions for related market goods. The values 
estimated are referred to as (indirect) use values and are a measure of the usefulness of 
wetlands to an individual (e.g., water filtration). Most of the revealed preference research for 
wetland valuation has applied the travel cost method with recreation as the related good 
(Raphael and Jaworski 1979, Miller and Hay 1981 ,  Thibodeau and Ostro 1981 ,  Farber 1988, 
Creel and Loomis 1992, van Vuuren and Roy 1993, Doss and Taff 1996, Mahan et al. 2000, 
Bennett and Whitten 2003). Primary drawbacks with using revealed preference methods for 
; 
valuing changes in wetland quality and availability include site-specific information, which 
complicates aggregation, and failure to capture nonuse values of wetlands. 
Stated preference nonmarket valuation techniques, such as choice modeling and contingent 
valuation, utilize hypothetical markets constructed within survey instruments to directly obtain 
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the willingness to pay of an individual for wetland services. These techniques have the 
capability of deriving values society places on wetlands external to their role in the economy, 
e.g., value of habitat for endangered species, as well as use values. The majority of stated 
preference studies of wetland valuation have applied the contingent valuation method 
(Thibodeau and Ostro 198 1 ,  Farber and Costanza 1987, Farber 1988, Bergstrom et al. 1990, 
Whitehead 1990, Loomis et al. 199 1 ,  Lupi et al. 199 1 ,  Whitehead and Blomquist 199 1 ,  
Stevens et al. 1995, Pate and Loomis 1997, Morrison et al. 1999, Oglethorpe and Miliadou 
2000, Spash 2000, Bennett 2001 ,  Randall et al. 2001 ,  Johnston et al. 2002). A principal 
argument against stated preference techniques is that hypothetical markets yield hypothetical 
values, which should not be used for real world policy and project analysis, especially in the 
case of unique environmental assets such as wetlands. 
The model we develop adopts a revealed preference methodology, in particular, the 
hedonic price method, such that the economic value of nonmarket attributes of forested 
wetlands is inferred through the prices buyers are willing to pay for merchantable wood. We 
assume that the values of these attributes vary across the watershed depending on their 
geographic location, that is, values are not randomly assigned, thus a form of spatial 
dependence or interaction is present. This dependence may help to explain variability in prices 
paid for merchantable wood and ignoring such dependence may result in a misspecified model 
that over or under reports the magnitude of nonmarket attribute values. We employ spatial 
econometric techniques to empirically test for and explicitly incorporate the influence of 
spatially interactive nonmarket attributes on predicted wood values in our valuation model. 
We then discuss the results from the perspective of justifying stream and wetland restoration 
efforts and improving resource management in forested wetlands. 
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The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows: section 2 describes the study area, 
identifies the issues, and explains the field methods; section 3 establishes the spatial theoretic 
model; sections 4 and 5 provide estimation results and the implicit values; a concluding 
section summarizes the research and recommends future directions for valuing damages to 
forested wetlands. 
2. Study Area 
2.1. Hatchie River Watershed 
Our study area spans three counties (Haywood, Madison, and Hardeman) in the upper 
portion of the lower Hatchie River Watershed (HRW) in West Tennessee. The HRW lies 
within the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Valley (LMA V) and Upper East Gulf Coastal Plain and 
comprises approximately 6,736 square km (USDA 1986), 55,848 ha of which is bottomland 
hardwood (BLH) forest ( 16  percent of all BLH in TN) (Schweitzer 2000). A principal river 
draining the HRW is the Hatchie River, which has been designated one of 13  State Scenic 
Rivers and one of the 75 "Last Great Places" by the Nature Conservancy. The Hatchie River is 
the longest unchannelized river remaining in the LMA V, however many of its tributaries have 
been channelized. Primary physical characteristics of the study area include flat topography, 
seasonal and permanent flooding, soils dominated by fine wind-blown soil (loess), and an oak­
hickory forest cover type. 
2.2. Issue Identification 
Soil erosion and excessive sedimentation are the critical issues for forested wetland 
ecosystems in the HRW. Erosion typically can lead to loss of upland areas, unstable channel 




having negative impacts on forested wetlands. Sedimentation is a normal process in wetland 
ecosystems that provides several benefits including replenished nutrients and fertile soil. 
Human interactions have accelerated this process, however, negatively altering functional 
processes of forested wetlands, such as nutrient cycling and flood abatement. Moreover, when 
excessive sedimentation is combined with changes in channel slope or debris jams, valley 
plugs and alluvial fans are created. These geomorphic structures �ause increased overbank 
flooding and excessive sand deposition in the floodplain. As a result, the floodplain system is 
damaged in several ways including: degraded aquatic habitats, reduced flood capacity, 
increased water table level, creation of natural levees, increased flooding and ponding of water 
that affects the survival, growth and regeneration of bottomland hardwood tree species, 
burying fertile soils with infertile sand and gravel, and increased lateral erosion (Happ et al. 
1940). Diehl (2000) has recorded over 35 valley plugs across the Hatchie River Watershed, 
with two-thirds located in our study area. 
Past and present land use practices, namely agricultural development and forest harvesting, 
in combination with channelization, have and continue to be the driving factors behind soil 
erosion and excessive sedimentation. These factors have led to erosion of the thin loess layer 
of the region, exposing and eroding the coarse alluvium sands beneath, thereby resulting in 
massive gully erosion. An estimated 580 million kilograms of sediment accumulates in the 
Hatchie River every year (USDA 1986). One of the most significant contributors is 
channelization, which refers to the straightening and dredging of a stream channel for flood 
control or navigational purposes. Such alterations cause a degradation of the stream channel 
and lead to channel erosion (Robbins and Simon 1983, Simon and Hupp 1987, Simon 1994). 
Several studies on sediment dynamics in West Tennessee suggest that channelization results in 
bed-level lowering and stream degradation (Hupp and Simon 1986, Darby and Simon 1999, 
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Diehl 2000). Additionally, channel alterations caused by channelization combine to increase 
stream velocity and power, which enables the stream to transport and deposit increased 
quantities of sediment downstream and into the floodplain (Gilvear and Bravard 1996). In the , 
HRW, 92 percent of the major tributaries have been channelized and since channelization of 
these tributaries, the main channel of the Hatchie River has become shallower and flooding 
has increased (USDA 1986). The emphasis ofthis paper and corresponding valuation model is 
on monetizing the impacts (or negative externalities) of channelization on forested wetlands in 
the HRW. 
2.3 Field Plots 
In order to apply a spatial, hedonic-type model to value factors affecting forested wetlands, 
a large number of field plots located across the continuum of ecological site conditions was 
necessary. Accordingly, 357 fixed-radius, circular plots were established along the Hatchie 
River and 5 different tributaries of the Hatchie River during Summer 2002 (Figure 3). The 
tributaries were selected by degree of hydrologic impairment and access, with the latter being 
the most limiting factor. Thirty three percent of the field plots were located on Federal lands 
(Hatchie National Wildlife Refugee) with the residual established on private, nonindustrial 
lands. 
At each site, field plots were established at 50m increments along transects located 200m 
apart and perpendicular to the selected tributary, with the first plot at the stream bank. 
; 
Approximately 40 site measurements were recorded per field plot, with each plot containing 
three sub-plots defined by different radii. Within the 1m2 inner circular plot ( lm radius), 
groundflora data were collected including species, average herbaceous height, and litter depth. 
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and 1 0  em, species and number of both seedlings (greater than 1m in height) and shrubs, and 
average sapling and shrub height measurements were recorded in the 0.004ha circular plot 
(5.6m radius). Information for all tree species greater than 10cm DBH, including canopy 
position, total height, sawtimber height, and stem quality were collected in the 0.04 ha outer 
circular plot ( 1 1 .3m radius). See Figure 4 for an example design applied in field data 
collection. Additional measurements within each plot included ocular estimates of the stand 
structure (even or uneven aged), stand development stage (initiation, stem exclusion, transition 
or old growth), past disturbance (logging, fire, flooding, and combinations thereof), 
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Figure 4 
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disturbance severity (light, moderate or severe) and time since disturbance (0-5, 5-25 or >25 
yrs). Finally, site information such as presence of water within the plot, percent canopy cover 
(determined with a site tube at plot center and from four points on the edge of the 1m2 plot), 
and the number and species of logs, snags, and stumps were collected at each plot. 
Collectively, all of the measured site attributes constitute microlevel data on the ecological 
condition and state of forest productivity at each plot. 
3. Spatial Theoretic Model 
3.1 Spatial Ecological Econometrics: Basic Principles 
The interaction of ecological and anthropogenic factors influencing forested wetland 
productivity and market value across the watershed motivates the use of spatial econometric 
models. To model productivity otherwise would require the restrictive and unrealistic 
assumption that ecological units, defined either by research requirements (e.g., field plot) or 
by the ecosystem (e.g., watershed), are unconnected or islands across the landscape. Under the 
island framework, only site specific factors affect productivity at the site and cross-site 
nutrient, climate, and related ecological interactions are ignored. Ecological research has 
shown that this assumption does not hold (Robbins and Simon 1983, Rossi et al. 1992, 
Legendre 1993), thus a framework that explicitly incorporates spatial interaction can be 
designed based on both theoretical and data-driven reasons. 
A basic spatial theoretic model of ecological interaction states that the productivity at plot i 
is implicitly determined by on-site and neighboring plot attributes: 
V i  e J  [1 ] 
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where q; is a scalar measure of ecological productivity (e.g., number of understory plant 
species), r; is a 1 x k row vector of measured plot attributes, s; is a 1 x k* row vector of 
unmeasured plot attributes (where k u k* = K), q_; is a 1 x k row vector of attributes defining 
productivity at all plots other than i, and J indexes plots. The separation of q; into measured 
and unmeasured components is necessary for ecological research since it is never practical or 
feasible to collect data on all attributes affecting site productivity. The inclusion of q_; is also a 
necessary addition to the spatial implicit model of site productivity and implies spatial 
interaction between/among neighboring sites. This formulation (i.e., q_;) is similar to the 
model of interacting agents in the public economics literature (see Brueckner 2003). 
The implicit spatial interaction specified in equation [ 40] can be explicitly modeled 
through a spatial lag or a spatial error model (Anselin 1 988).30 The spatial lag model includes 
a spatially lagged dependent variable (ZQ), computed as the weighted sum of values of q at all 
neighboring locations, as a separate term in the set of explanatory variables. Accordingly, the 
spatial lag model for equation [ 1 ]  is 
Q = <jlZQ + XP + f..l [2] 
where Q is a J x 1 vector of site productivity, Z is the J x J spatial weights matrix, Q is a J x 1 
vector of spatially lagged dependent values, <jl is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, X is a J 
� 
x k matrix of measurements on R (where R denotes measured attributes across all plots), � is a 
k x 1 matrix of coefficients and f..l is assumed to be a J x 1 vector of independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) error terms with mean zero and constant variance Jd-. A spatial 
30 Equation [ 1 ]  can also be modeled with higher order models such as spatial lag with spatial error 
components or models that incorporate spatial heterogeneity through spatial regimes. 
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lag model might be specified for equation [ 1 ]  if theory suggested that productivity across sites 
was functionally dependent on the productivity at each neighboring site. 
In contrast to the spatial lag model, the spatial error specification models the spatial 
interaction among sites through the error term: 
Q = XP + Jl 
J.1 = A.ZJ..l + e [3] 
where A. is the spatial autoregressive parameter that is jointly estimated with the other model 
parameters J3, ZJ..l is the spatially lagged error term, and e is a J x 1 vector of i.i.d. error terms 
with zero mean and constant variance Q (and all other terms are explained above). The error 
component for Q will equal e if Z is nonzero for some elements and there is insignificant 
correlation of unobserved site attributes across neighboring plots. In the case of a significant 
spatial autoregressive parameter, the spatial error model captures the influence of both the 
measured attributes R and the omitted attributes S (where S is an aggregate index of 
unmeasured attributes across all plots) on the productivity at site i. Thus, in this formulation, 
unobserved or unmeasured on-site and neighboring attributes play a significant role in 
explaining differences in site productivity across space. 
Spatial econometric estimation of equation [ 1 ]  with either the spatial lag or spatial error 
model depends critically on the specification of the spatial weights matrix Z. Generally, zero 
elements of Z indicate islands and nonzero elements measure the weight of association 
between neighbors. Formally, Z is a J x J matrix with elements zij corresponding to the 
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Euclidean distance between two points i and} (denoted dif).3 1 The diagonal elements of Z (zii) 
are set equal to zero indicating that an observation is not a neighbor to itself (Anselin 2004). If 
some element zif has dif > 0, then the researcher can specify a particular weight (or functional 
form) to the element. Commonly used forms include binary weights (based on either first or 
second order contiguity), inverse distance weights (such as the "gravity index"), and k-nearest 
neighbors (used primarily in real estate analyses). For binary weights, Zif = 1 if i and} share a 
common border (first order binary contiguity) and zero otherwise; alternatively, zif = 1 if i and 
j are not adjacent, but through a common border with 1, are contiguous (second order binary 
contiguity). Binary weights based on contiguity can also be computed for points, such as 
polygon centroids, using a distance criterion. For example, two points i and} are neighbors (zif 
= 1 )  if the distance between them is less than some cut-off distance (i.e., dy" � dif). Inverse 
distance weights for zif are computed as lldif� (t � 1) and imply decreasing association between 
two sites with increasing separation. This form of spatial weight seems appropriate in 
ecological research since attribute interaction will tend to be stronger with increasing 
proximity. The k-nearest neighbors specification requires each zif to have the same number of 
neighbors, thus eliminating islands and reducing variability in Z. Figure 4 presents two 4 x 4 
spatial weights matrices Z using binary and inverse distance weights for the field plot design 
employed in this study. 
3.2. Spatial Ecological Econometrics in Site Attribute Pricing 
.. 
Since ecological relationships and negative externalities associated with channelization are 
by definition unpriced and hypothesized to vary by geographical location, we employ a spatial 
31 Computation of spatial weights matrix Z (and hence dif) requires georeferenced coordinates for 
each site. For this study, global positioning system units were used to collect the latitude and longitude 
of each plot center. 
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implicit econometric model to monetize site attributes. The theoretical development of the 
model is based on the hedonic price method (Freeman 1993, Rosen 1 974), whereby the effects 
of ecological and anthropogenic factors are assumed to be capitalized into the market value of 
merchantable pulpwood and sawtimber. Monetary values for individual site attributes are then 
econometrically estimated through an indirect relationship between the market value of 
merchantable wood and the attributes. A principal assumption underlying our model is that as 
the quality of site attributes increases (for example, more productive soils), both forest 
productivity (measured by volume ha-1) and percentage of preferred tree species increase, and 
overall, the market value of merchantable wood increases because a buyer would be willing to 
pay a premium for these higher quality forests. The ecological component of this assumption 
is supported by decades of research in bottomland hardwood forests (e.g., Hodges 1 997) and 
the willingness to pay component follows from economic theory, thus lending credibility to 
the model. Additional model assumptions are provided over the course of the next several 
equations. 
Given the theoretical structure presented in equation [ 1 ], spatial econometric models are 
necessary in order to explicitly incorporate spatial interaction in the da ta. Ignoring this 
interaction in model estimation affects the significance and magnitudes of the coefficients 
(Anselin 1 988, Anselin et al. 1 996), which in our case are the basis for determining the 
economic value of unpriced site attributes (namely, externalities of channelization). Thus, we 
are motivated to use spatial econometric models on both theoretical and empirical 
considerations. 
The dependent variable in the spatial implicit valuation model is the aggregate market 




m = l  n = l  
[4] 
where W is the market price of wood volume, V denotes cords (fe) of pulpwood (P) and 
thousand board feet (fe) of sawtimber (1), o denotes the delivered price per unit of V, i 
indexes field plots, m indexes pulpwood species groups, and n indexes sawtimber species and 
groups.32 The total market value W varies across plots due to different species compositions, 
32 Market prices for pulpwood (DBH < 30.5cm) and sawtimber (DBH � 30.5cm) were derived from 
the July-September 2002 Tennessee Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry's Wood Products 
Bulletin (WPB) (Tennessee Department of Agriculture, 2002). The WPB lists delivered timber prices 
per thousand board feet (mbf), Doyle Rule, for specific species (e.g., tulip poplar), species groups (e.g., 
red oak), and a miscellaneous category, which includes boxelder and elm species. Pulpwood prices are 
reported as delivered prices per cord (90 ft? of solid wood and bark per cord) and based on the general 
product class "hardwood". Delivered prices are presently the only viable market data available for 
merchantable wood in our study area. The alternative of stumpage prices is not feasible given limited 
species-specific price information. A concern with delivered prices in our model is that we must assume 
buyers implicitly value the site attributes that contributed to the growth of the purchased wood. This 
relationship can be shown mathematically using a series of implicit functions. First, express V in 
equation [4] as a function of q;: 
'rf i e J  [5] 
so that the total quantity of merchantable wood at each site (i.e., field plot) i is a function of the quality 
at the site. Next, decompose the measurable component of equation [1] ,  r;, so that it is equal to: 
r; = r(t;, y;) [6] 
where t comprises the measurable components at the site that the buyer is most concerned with, e.g., 
species, DBH, height, and overall tree quality, and y comprises all other measurable site attributes, e.g., 
canopy closure and whether or not the site is located near a channelized stream. Substituting equation 
[6] into equation [ 1 ]  and theri'the resulting expression into equation [5], we have: 
V; = v{ q[r(t;, y;), s;; q_;]} [7] 
Equation [7] now states that the quantity of wood at a site is a function of measurable attributes taken 
directly and indirectly into account by a buyer, unmeasured attributes, and neighboring site conditions. 
Finally, if we express the price a buyer pays for delivered timber and pulpwood (BT.l) as a function of V; 
and x, a vector of non-ecological, exogenous factors that affect the individual's decision making 
process, e.g., time of year (where a subscript on x denoting buyers is dropped for convenience without 
changing the outcome): 
1 10 
stem densities, and product mixes, which in turn is directly influenced by differences in site 
conditions. Accordingly, W can be written as an implicit function of growing site attributes: 
W; = w(q;) [ 10] 
where q; is a 1 x K vector of all on-site attributes defining quality "at plot i. We hypothesize 
that W is increasing at a decreasing rate with increases in q (oW/oq > 0, ffWioq2 < 0). 
Substituting equation [ 1] into equation [ 1 0] gives W; as an implicit function of measured and 
unmeasured attributes at plot i and all neighboring plots -i: 
W; = w{q(r;, s;); q_;} [ 1 1 ]  
Based on the spatial implicit function given by equation [ 1 1] ,  we can derive the marginal 
implicit price of the kth measured attribute in R by partially differentiating with respect to the 
element and setting the solution equal to zero. In the case of a linear functional form for 
equation [ 1 1 ] ,  W = RP + Jl, the marginal implicit price is simply the coefficient from the 
estimated regression equation: 
aw; aRk = rk [ 12] 
8T.P = 8(V;, x) [8] 
then the following relationship can be shown: 
8T.P = 8{v[q(r(t;, y;), s;; q_;)], x} \;;/ i E J [9] 
Equation [9] shows that the price an individual pays for delivered wood can be used to price t; and y;, 
but at the same time delivered prices are an imperfect measure because they are more than a function of 
just these two variables. 
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3.3. Model Specification 
The explicit form of the spatial implicit valuation model for the microlevel data on 
attributes influencing forested wetland productivity and condition, and correspondingly, , 
market value, is written as: 
LNPLOT_TOTAL; =/{[CHANNELIZED; CLOSURE; STREAM_DIST; DISTRUB; 
CHAN* STREAM; ROAD _DIST; OAK; CYPRESSi] ' * 
[ 13] 
where the relationship between the dependent variable and explanatory variables may be 
nonlinear, Jl may or may not be normal, i.i.d, and i indexes field plots (see Table 7 for 
explanation and descriptive statistics of each variable). Diagnostic tests for misspecification of 
equation [ 13] are carried out based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with resultant 
statistics measuring strength against null hypotheses of homoskedastic, normally distributed, 
and spatially independent error terms Jl;. Additionally, informal tests for potential model 
misspecification are conducted using several different functional forms of equation [ 13] .  
Homoskedasticity is  checked with the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979), if 
normality holds, and with the Koenker-Bassett test (Koenker 198 1 ,  Koenker and Bassett 1 982) 
if not. In either case, robust estimation procedures, such as the groupwise heteroskedasticity 
specification (Anselin 1992, p. 220) can be used to explicitly incorporate nonconstant error 
variance in model estimation. The assumption of a normally distributed error term is tested 
with the Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and Bera 1 987) and if violated, maximum likelihood (ML) 
and OLS estimation techniques cannot be used to estimate equation [ 13] because these 
methods are based on normality. If the assumption of normality does not hold, the more 
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Table 7 
Explanation and descriptive statistics for field plot attributes by stream channel condition 
Natural Streams6 Channelized Streams 
{n = 133}' (n = 224) 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. (Plot attribute) 
PLOT_TOTAL Market value of woody stems 155.79 1 13.80 515.00 471 .94 ( >  10 cm) ($) 
CHANNELIZED = 1 if the plot is located on a 
transect originating from a stream 
that had been channelized; 0 
otherwise (-) � 
CLOSURE Percent closure of overstory 70.57 24.98 78.98 21 .70 
canopy; computed as the average of 
5 measurements taken at each plot 
(%) (+) 
STREAM_DIST Distance from stream channel to 1 14.66 89.78 192.41 160.95 
plot center (m) (+) 
DISTURB Multicategory variable measuring 2.10 0.91 2.50 0.69 
effect of time since last significant 
disturbance on site productivity and 
plot market values; time is 
measured in discrete categories, 0-
5, 5-25, and >25 yrs, which are 
interacted with severity of 
disturbance (levels 1 through 3 
with severity greatest at level 3); 
base category is 0-5 years with 
"minimal" (level 1 )  disturbance; 
time and severity measures visually 
determined at each plot (?) 
CHAN*STREAM Interaction term measuring effect 142.96 76.73 
of channelization on plot market 
values across different distances 
from stream channel (-) 
ROAD_DIST Euclidean distance from nearest 2935.94 13984.76 760.18 475.77 
road to plot center (m) (-) 
OAK Number of sawtimber size oak 0.52 1 .32 2.09 2.40 
stems ( > 25.4 em) (+) 
CYPRESS Number of sawtimber size cypress 0.21 1 .04 0.50 1 .28 
stems ( > 25.4 em) (+) 
Notes: Signs in parentheses indicate expected relationship with the dependent variable PLOT_ TOTAL. 
• Number of field plots. 
b Natural streams are defined as streams that have not been channelized. 
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flexible generalized moments (Kelejian and Prucha 1999) procedure, which does not rely on 
parametric assumptions for J.l, must be applied to the estimation of equation [ 1 3].  
Robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests (if J.l; are normal) (Anselin et al. 1996) or the , 
Kelejian-Robinson (KR) test (if J.l; are not normal) (Kelejian and Robinson 1992), where both 
are asymptotic and x! distributed tests, provide statistical evidence for the most appropriate 
econometric representation of the underlying spatial dependence (i.e., lag vs. error). As a 
review, if the dependence is across neighboring values of the dependent variable, i.e., 
cov[W;�] -:t:. 0, then the spatial lag model is the appropriate representation. If the spatial 
dependence is between error terms, cov[J.l;J.lj] -:t:. 0, the spatial error model should be applied. 
We believe, a priori, the spatial dependence to be of the spatial error type. Spatial dependence 
in the error term can be modeled with OLS and yield unbiased coefficients, but these estimates 
will be inefficient. In order to derive unbiased and efficient estimates, the spatial error model 
is estimated by maximum likelihood, instrumental variables or generalized moments 
procedures. 
Tests for spatial dependence as well as significance and magnitude of estimated model 
parameters are dependent on the specified weight matrix. In a hedonic price study of property 
values in Maryland, Bell and Bockstael (2000) report empirical evidence on the sensitivity of 
coefficients to different specifications of Z. In order to explicitly address this potential 
problem, we estimate equation [ 1 3] with an inverse distance weight functional form of the 
weight matrix with multiple cut-off or critical distances (d;/). ; 
4. Results 
The results of generalized moments estimation of equation [ 1 3] are reported in Table 8. A 
variety of model diagnostic tests were conducted based on OLS estimation of the model and 
1 14 
Table 8 
Results of robust, generalized moments estimation of the spatial error model representation 
of the implicit valuation model 
Semi-Log Model Double-Log Model Square-Root Model 
Plot Attribute Robust GM Robust GM Robust GM Robust GM Robust GM Robust GM 
(du· = 800) (du· = 1500) (du* = 800) (du" = 1500) (du" = 800) (du· = 1500) 
CONSTANT 4.613* 4.609* 6.429* 6.427* 4.132* 4.129* (0.22329) (0.22438) (0.56977) (0.57471) (0.29556) (0.29648) 
CHANNELIZED --{).933* --{).927* -1 .08* --{).953* -1 .004* --{).986* 
(1=Yes) (0.22439) (0.22578) (0.37941)  (0.3875 1)  , (0.23349) (0.23447) 
CLOSURE 0.014* 0.014* 
(%) (0.00213) (0.00214) 
LNCANOPY_ 0.682* 0.678* 
CLOSURE (0.07038) (0.07038) 
SQRTCANOPY_ 0.228* 0.228* 
CLOSURE (0.02681)  (0.02681)  
STREAM_DIST --{).001 --{).001 
(m) (0.00045) (0.00045) 
LNSTREAM --{).030 --{).030 -
DISTANCE (0.02846) (0.02843) 
SQRTSTREAM_ --{).012 --{).012 
DISTANCE (0.00958) (0.00957) 
DISTURB --{).105 --{). 106 --{).073 --{).076 -{).I 02 --{). 103 
(0.07548) (0.07584) (0.07910) (0.07947) (0.07381) (0.07413) 
CHAN* STREAM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00107) (0.00106) (0.00104) (0.00104) 
ROAD_DIST -5.90E-5* -5.91E-5* 
(m) (0.000 1) (0.000 1) 
LNROAD_DIST --{).585* --{).589* 
(0.06032) (0.06058) 
SQRTROAD _DIST --{).018* --{).018* 
(0.00160) (0.00161) 
OAK 0. 1 1 8* 0.1 1 8* 0.107* 0.107* 0. 1 12* 0.1 1 1 *  
( > 25.4 em) (0.02228) (0.02227) (0.021 36) (0.021 35) (0.02137) (0.02137) 
CYPRESS 0.173* 0.173* 0.175* 0.178* 0.182* 0. 182* 
( > 25.4 em) (0.04124) (0.041 19) (0.03985) (0.03981) (0.03975) (0.03971)  
).. 0.4W 0.469 0.743 0.760 0.505 0.51 8  
R2 0.528 0.522 0.639 0.600 0.565 0.557 
OLS diagnostics6 
Jarque-Bera 107.889* 24.240* 3 1 .7 1 1 *  
Koenker-Bassett• 0.053 0.498 0.386 
Kelejian-Robinson 25.532* 26.737* 68.379* 58.396* 27.830* 23.946* 
Multicollinearity 10.866 26.993 16.710 
condition number 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the market value of all standing pulpwood and sawtimber stems in each 
field plot; * indicates significance at the 99% confidence level; 357 observations for each model; R2 values are 
computed as the ratio of the variance of the predicted values over the variance of the observed values for market 
value (Anselin 1 995). 
• Standard errors are not computed for the spatial autoregressive parameter 'A in generalized moments estimation. 
b The Jarque-Bera and Koenker-Basset (KB) tests and the multicollinearity condition number are calculated for the 
same OLS model, regardless of the specified form of the spatial weights matrix. Accordingly, only one value for 
each diagnostic is reported per set of models. 
c The KB test is conducted against a model that has already been corrected for heteroskedasticity, thus we should 
expect to fail to reject H0: constant error variance. 
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include the following. Tests for normally distributed, homoskedastic error terms were strongly 
rejected at the 99 percent confidence level (see Table 8 for Jarque-Bera and Koenker-Basset 
statistics), thus robust, nonparametric estimation methods were applied. Robust estimation 
included an additive, groupwise heteroskedasticity specification, with CHANNELIZED as the 
grouping variable. Spatial lag and spatial error models were estimated but due to 
nonnormality, only the null hypothesis of spatial independence could be tested in the spatial 
error model.33 Results of the Kelejian-Robinson test for all spatial error models indicate 
significant spatial dependence across the error terms of neighboring plots. Thus, a spatial error 
representation of the spatial dependence inherent in the data is an appropriate econometric 
specification of the valuation model. 
Informal tests of potential model misspecification were conducted by specifying several 
functional forms for both the spatial error model and the spatial weights matrix. Semi-
logarithmic, double-logarithmic, and square root functional forms of the spatial error model 
were each estimated with two critical distances, 800m and 1500m, defining the maximum 
distance for two neighboring plots in the spatial weights matrix. The critical distances pertain 
to the average (800m) and maximum (1500m) distance between any two plots in a common 
site. The qualitative results of these different model specifications are surprisingly similar, 
indicating model validity and relevance of included explanatory variables. Each model 
explained more than half of the variability in plot market values, which is a promising finding 
given the considerable spatial variability in plot locations and the complex ecological 
; 
relationships between site attributes and productivity. This result indicates there is a common 
set of measurable ecological factors that significantly influence forest productivity and market 
values across the watershed. The core set of attributes (variables) significant in all models 
33 Model estimation was conducted in SpaceStat (Anselin 1995), which currently does not provide 
the Kelejian-Robinson test of spatial dependence for the spatial lag model. Accordingly, only the results 
of the spatial error model are presented in Table 8. 
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includes whether or not the plot is located along a stream that has been channelized, percent 
canopy closure, distance (m) from the nearest road, and number of sawtimber size (> 25.4cm) 
oak and cypress stems. The sign of each variable was consistent with our expectations. 
Distance (m) from the stream channel, time elapsed since the last significant disturbance, and 
an interaction term between stream channelization and distance from stream channel were not 
significant in any model. These later terms may be insignificant due to the wide range of 
ecological conditions present across the watershed, which confound the relationship between 
each attribute and plot value. 
An inverse distance weights (IDW) specification of the relationship between two 
neighboring plots was used to define the spatial weights matrix in the spatial error models. We 
experimented with multiple cut-off distances to test the extent of spatial interaction and found 
significant spatial dependence up to 20km, after which the software was unable to compute the 
model. In ecological research, it is reasonable to expect site attributes to be spatially correlated 
across large expanses, or in the present case, an entire watershed, because of shared abiotic 
and biotic processes endemic to the system. As discussed in Bell and Bockstael (2000), 
though, row standardization of the spatial weights matrix, which is necessary for the 
generalized moments estimation procedure, results in greater weight given to plots that are 
more distant.34 Consequently, while a significantly large cut-off distance (or simply, no cut-
oft) may seem sensible from an ecological modeling standpoint, it is computationally 
intractable and improperly weights the strength of spatial dependence. To avoid this problem 
and still incorporate the inverse relationship between distance and spatial dependence, we 
choose to use the overall average and maximum distance between plots at a common site. 
34 Row standardization refers to the recalculation of each cell of the spatial weights matrix by 
dividing cell values by their respective row total such that the row sum of all new cell values equals I .  
In the case of more distant plots with fewer neighbors and smaller weights, the row total is less than that 
of plots in the opposite case. Accordingly, a smaller denominator will result in a larger row 
standardized cell value (spatial weight), relative to non-standardization. 
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Under this framework, the unmeasured components of plots are spatially dependent 
(neighbors) if they are located in the same site and independent otherwise. As stated earlier, 
model estimation results are qualitatively similar for the two cut-off distances, with coefficient 
magnitudes only slightly lower for the greater cut-off distance. 
In addition to testing the sensitivity of model estimates to different specifications of the 
spatial weights matrix, we estimated equation [ 13] with three nonlinear functional forms. 
Nonlinear models were specified because imposing linearity between the dependent and 
independent variables requires the restrictive assumption of perfect substitutability between 
each attribute. As an example, two oak trees cannot be substituted for one cypress tree. For all 
three forms, the contribution of each continuous attribute (variable) to the economic value of 
the plot increases at a decreasing rate, which is in accordance with the theoretical specification 
in equation [ 10] .  In the semi-log model, attribute contribution, measured by the parameter 
estimate, is interpreted as the percentage change in plot value with a unit change in the 
attribute (i.e., partial elasticity). For the double-log model, coefficients are interpreted as 
elasticities; interpretation is not as straightforward for the square root model. Estimation 
results for all three models are very similar, but the double-log model explains the most 
variability in plot values for both specifications of the spatial weights matrix (R2 = 64 and 60 
percent for d;/ = 800m and 1500m, respectively). 
Given that all six model specifications are qualitatively similar, choice of a particular 
model for attribute interpretation and calculation of implicit prices will not lead to inconsistent 
conclusions. We chose the' double-log model evaluated at a cut-off distance of 1500m for three 
reasons, foremost of which is our belief that the cut-off distance should be as great as possible 
without compromising the integrity of the spatial weights. Second, of the three models 
evaluated at 1500m, the double-log model explains the most variability in plot values. Finally, 
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this model specification provides a parameter estimate for the key policy variable 
CHANNELIZED that is approximately the average of the values reported in the semi-log and 
square root models. Thus, based on generalized moments estimation of a double-log, spatial 
autoregressive error representation of the implicit valuation model equation [ 13], the impact of 
stream channelization on forested wetland market values is such that 95 percent of the average 
economic value of the nearby forest is lost. Since channelization has been restricted for over 
thirty years by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Section 404), 
this significant reduction in forest value reflects the cumulative damages to local forested 
wetland productivity and condition caused by the negative externalities associated with 
channelization, which include excessive sedimentation and channel bank and bed erosion. 
Regarding the remaining variables, the coefficients for percent of overstory canopy closure 
and number of sawtimber size oak and cypress stems were highly significant and positive. 
Based on the estimates in Table 8, a one percent increase in canopy closure and a one unit 
increase in oak and cypress stems results in a 68, 1 1 , and 1 8  percent increase in average plot 
value, respectively. The variable capturing the relationship between distance from the nearest 
road and plot values had the expected negative sign, indicating an inverse relationship 
between plot value and distance, but reported an estimate greater in magnitude than we 
expected. The average market value of a plot decreases by 59 percent for each one percent 
increase in distance (m) between the plot and the nearest road. 
5. Implicit values 
The economic values derived from the valuation framework are implicit since a direct 
relationship does not exist between ecological attributes and channelization and the market 
value of a forested wetland; value for these nonmarket site attributes arises from an indirect 
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relationship with the aggregate economic value of merchantable wood in the wetland. Similar 
to hedonic pricing, implicit prices are calculated from model first order conditions. For the 
continuous variables, implicit prices are simply calculated by partially differentiating equation 
[ 13] with respect to each variable and setting the solution equal to zero, holding all other 
attributes constant (refer to Table 9). Prices for continuous variables are often referred to as 
marginal implicit prices because they measure the monetary change in the dependent variable 
as the result of a marginal, or one unit change, in a right hand side variable. Due to the discrete 
nature of the variable CHANNELIZED, the implicit price for channelization is a measure of 
the partial and not marginal effect on plot values. The implicit price (denoted IP) of damages 
(negative externalities) associated with channelization is thus computed as the difference in 
expected values of equation [ 13] when CHANNELIZED is set equal to one and zero, ceterus 
paribus: 
IPcHANNELIZED = E[LNPLOT _TOT ALl Xt, CHANNELIZED = 1] -
- E[LNPLOT _TOTAL I Xt. CHANNELIZED = 0] [14] 
where k indexes remaining regressors (Long 1997, p. 14). Table 9 provides the equations and 
resultant implicit prices for the significant attributes from the double-log, spatial 
autoregressive model (evaluated at 1500m). 
Following equation [14] and assuming natural stream conditions, the partial implicit price 
for CHANNELIZED is _:'$217.54 per plot or -$5,438 ha·1.35 Since natural streams are by 
definition unchannelized, the impact of channelization on the market value of forested 
35 We caution against aggregating the per plot damage value beyond a ha·1 basis since we do not 
know at present how far out these damages extend into the floodplain. The insignificant sign on the 




Implicit prices for field plot attributes 
Implicit Price 
Plot Attribute Implicit Price Equation• Channelized Streams Natural Streams 
(X1 = 1) (X1 = 0) 
CHANNELIZED6 X/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y1X1 + ygX8)X6Y6 - -$21 7.54 per plot $217.54 per plot 
X/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y1X1 + ygX8)X6Y6 [-$5438.44 ha-1) [$5438.44 ha-1) 
CLOSURE y2X/Y2 - l)exp(y0 + y1X1 + y7X7 + ygX8)X6Y6 $1 .3 1  per plot $3.28 per plot 
(%) [$32.86 ha-1] ($81 .92 ha-1] 
ROAD_DIST y£)(/'6 - 1lexp(y0 + y1X1 + y�7 + ygX8)X2Y2 -$2.36 m·� -$6. 10  m·1 
(m) [-$236.00 kn11] [$610.00 km-1] 
OAK. y�/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y�7 + ygX8)X6Y6 $15.43 per plot $38.71 per plot 
( > 25.4 em) [$385.78 ha-1] [$967.69 ha-1] 
CYPRESS ygX/2exp(y0 + y1X1 + y1X1 + ygX8)X6Y6 $25.67 per plot $64.39 per plot 
( > 25.4 em) [$641 .76 ha-1] [$1609.80 ha-1] 
Note: Calculated implicit prices are based on coefficients from the robust, generalized moments estimation of the 
spatial autoregressive error model listed in Column 5 of Table 8. 
• Gamma notation identifies estimated parameters, with subscripts on each X denoting individual variables 
(corresponding to the order given in Eq. [ 13]). The implicit price equation is equivalent to the marginal (partial) 
effect of each continuous (discrete) variable on the dependent variable and is calculated for each data point and 
then averaged. The sample average is reported in the Implicit Price columns. 
b The partial effect of channelization on plot values is computed as in the following manner: LlE(YjX] I M1 = 
E[Y!Xk.Xi=O] - E(Y!X!.%,=1). 
wetlands along natural streams represents the potential outcome if the stream were to be 
channelized. That is, a wood buyer would be willing to pay approximately $21 8  less for a site 
that changed from an unaltered to an altered state, given sufficient passage of time so that the 
full effects of the change are realized. Alternatively, the absolute value of these estimates 
reflects the monetary gain in forest worth if channelized streams and surrounding impacted 
forested wetlands were restored to their natural condition. 
It is import�t to note that these values are based on delivered wood prices, which take into 
account transportation and harvesting costs. These costs should not be included in the 
valuation of on-site damages to forested wetlands. Accordingly, implicit prices reported in this 
paper do not represent the true net value lost to society as a result of channelization. An 
on plot values vary too much across different distances from the stream channel to uncover any 
statistically significant relationship. 
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average value for the percent of delivered prices that can be allocated to these costs is 39 
percent, based on Timber Mart South (2003) data for our study area. 
These estimates represent the first published findings of the significant, long-term , 
economic impacts channelization has had on forested wetlands, since earlier wetland valuation 
research focused on valuing individual wetland services or entire wetland ecosystems. In 
essence, our models show that channelization has had the unfortunate, unintended 
consequence of impacting forested wetlands to such an extent that they can no longer produce 
a viable supply of merchantable wood. Moreover, in terms of unmeasured, nonpriced site 
attributes, the capacity of impacted sites to provide wildlife habitat, scenic beauty, nutrient 
transformation, flood abatement, and water filtration has been severely diminished. By 
depositing and facilitating the movement of excessive quantities of sediment, which stifles 
plant, tree, and soil productivity and eventually reduces the site to an unproductive condition, 
channelization has virtually homogenized the vegetative structure and composition of sites 
along altered streams. Sites are now defined by a select number of understory and overstory 
species that can survive in harsh, impacted conditions. The tree species of this set are of such 
low market and ecological value that the economic worth of the wetland is reduced to mere 
dollars and sustainability of the system compromised. 
While we believe the monetary estimates of damages associated with channelization are 
reasonable and defensible, a few caveats should be highlighted. First, the basis for the 
valuation component of the model is an indirect relationship between the economic values an 
; 
individual places on merchantable wood and measurable on-site attributes. We acknowledged 
that the relationship was not a first best solution for valuing site attributes (see footnote 32), 
yet at the same time provided a means for linking productivity, ecological and anthropogenic 
factors, and overall forest market value for the ultimate purpose of monetizing damages to 
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both the site and the system. Beyond the somewhat complicated theoretical linkages, the 
model relies on a quite simple concept that is consistent with economic theory in that attribute 
value is measured by the additional amount an individual (i.e., wood buyer) is willing to pay 
for a site with higher quality attributes. Conversely, an economic agent would be willing to 
pay less for undesirable sites due to degraded attributes, which in our study is credited to 
channelization and excessive sedimentation. Thus, while a direllt relationship would be 
preferable for monetizing damages to forested wetlands, the implicit valuation framework 
presented here represents an initial pass that is consistent with economic, ecological, and 
spatial econometric theory. 
The second caveat is a corollary to the first and identifies the values calculated with the 
valuation model as use values, or measures of the usefulness of the resource to the individual. 
Consequently, measures of nonuse values lost because of channelization cannot be captured in 
the model. Third, the real applicability of the model is in valuing cumulative damages to 
systems that are spatially and temporally dependent. For monetary assessment of damages 
from immediate disturbances, whether human or natural, standard accounting or real estate 
appraisal methods (e.g., replacement cost) should be applied. Last, since channelization is a 
discrete event restricted for the last 30 years, the opportunity to internalize the negative 
externalities is by definition limited. Thus, while the damage estimates may be used to 
evaluate future channelization projects the more likely application may be to provide 
information for restoring impacted sites, resource damage assessment, and ecosystem 
management. 
For the most part, these caveats apply to the implicit prices calculated for the remaining 






one percent increase in overstory canopy closure from the mean value of 79 percent is $3.28.36 
This estimate implies that a landowner interested in maximizing the economic value of 
pulpwood and sawtimber would pursue forest management strategies that lead to increases in 
the percent of closure. The landowner would do so only to a point as the curvature of the 
relationship between canopy closure and plot value indicates benefits increasing at a 
decreasing rate. From an ecological and economic standpoint, this result is reasonable since 
too much canopy closure would lead to increased competition and consequently reduced 
growth rates and value. The marginal implicit price for a one meter increase in distance 
between a plot and the nearest road is -$6. 1 0  or -$61  for each l OOm increase. The price of 
increasing separation is not trivial and indicates that there is a zone wherein a landowner 
should expend resources on forest management, since beyond the zone management costs 
exceed benefits. Lastly, the marginal contribution to average plot value from an increase of 
one oak and cypress tree species is $38.71 and $64.39, respectively. In terms of forest 
management, a profit maximizing landowner in our study area should pursue artificial and 
natural regeneration efforts until the marginal benefit of increased oak and cypress stems just 
equals marginal planting and maintenance costs. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents the application of a spatial theoretic, implicit valuation model to 
develop a set of implicit prices for factors affecting productivity and market value of forested 
.. 
wetlands in the Hatchie River Watershed in West Tennessee. In particular, prices were 
estimated for ecological relationships and negative externalities associated with 
36 For this and the following site attributes, only the implicit prices computed for natural streams are 
reported and discussed. The basis for the exclusion of prices for channelized streams in this discussion 
is that landowners would not expend resources on marginal changes in the forest structure when those 
resources would have greater value if expended toward overall site restoration. 
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channelization. The costs of channelization are significant, with 95 percent of the market value 
of a forest lost as a consequence of this anthropogenic activity. On a per hectare basis, a wood 
buyer is willing to pay $5,438 less for a forest located along a channelized stream than a 
similar forest located along a natural stream. These results indicate a role for forest 
management in terms of restoration and more importantly, a significant role for stream 
restoration projects that focus on returning the natural hydrolt'Jgical and sedimentation 
processes to channelized streams. 
The primary motivation for developing a model to value damages to forested wetlands 
arose from inadequate knowledge of the economic magnitude of cumulative impacts that 
negative anthropogenic factors have had on the integrity of forested wetlands. Previous 
research predominately focused on valuing the ecological functions and services provided by 
wetlands and valued by individuals, whereas this research addressed the valuation of 
individual attributes that affect site quality and overall system functioning. We applied spatial 
econometric procedures because of the inherent interconnectedness among ecological 
attributes across the watershed. Failing to recognize these relationships would have resulted in 
a misspecified model and possibly biased implicit prices. Nonparametric estimation 
procedures allowed us to address the nonnormal distribution of the unobserved component 
across plots and different functional forms of both the spatial weights matrix and the model 
were tested to assess the sensitivity of estimated parameters. The results of nonparametric, 
spatial autoregressive error estimation of the different specifications were surprisingly stable, 
thereby lending credibility to the valuation framework and resultant implicit prices. However, 
while the method applied in this study is simple and flexible it provides prices for only a small 
subset of the attributes of a forested wetland ecosystem. Accordingly, this method should be 
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used in addition to other wetland valuation techniques and under different ecological 
conditions to determine the economic value of forested wetland attributes. 
In a general sense, wetland valuation can provide useful information for cost benefit , 
analysis, policy evaluation, resource damage assessment, ecosystem management, and 
increasing public awareness of the importance of wetlands. Specific to the case of valuing 
damages to forested wetlands, economic information in the form of implicit prices provides 
balanced information to stakeholders on the tradeoffs between discrete activities, such as 
draining and filling a wetland or leaving the resource in tact. Prior to the Clean Water Act 
Amendments, the potential consequences of channelization in terms of diminished ecosystem 
productivity and lost timber revenue were probably assumed negligible or discarded 
altogether. If the responsible party, i.e., the damager, were to have to access to the present 
information then decisions regarding channelization projects might have been at least delayed 
and possibly canceled. Of course, we will never know the outcome, but when evaluating 
present and future system altering projects, this type of information may play a critical role in 
balancing potential costs and benefits. 
The greatest role for valuing damages to forested wetlands may be in the evaluation of 
alternative stream and wetland restoration projects. Since many of the benefits of restoration 
are nonmarket in nature there is a positive probability they will be under or over stated in a 
cost benefit analysis. Restoration efforts, then, can be made more efficient by including the 
implicit prices of damages to nonmarket attributes. Additionally, given budget and time 
; 
constraints, agencies and individuals pursuing restoration can use this information to guide the 
selection process toward those sites that have endured the greatest nonmarket losses. 
However, for some forested wetlands located along channelized streams, especially in our 
study area, restoration may not be economically feasible as the sites are severely degraded. In 
126 
these cases, the costs outweigh the benefits and the goals of the restoration project may be 
better served elsewhere. 
Valuation, though, is just one step in the process toward restoring altered streams and 
degraded forested wetlands. The greatest challenge for future valuation research may lie in 
communicating the results of valuation studies to communities, policy makers, and resource 
specialists in a comprehendible format. Incorporating the interests of these stakeholders in the 
initial phases of the valuation process may help to ensure that efforts are directed toward the 
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Summary and Conclusions 
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• 
This dissertation approached the valuation of environmental quality in two Tennessee 
watersheds from both applied and theoretical perspectives. The theory underlying each 
, 
application was presented to demonstrate the basis for selection of specific valuation 
methodologies, highlight weaknesses, and opportunities for extension to other problems. Two 
spatially and ecologically distinct watersheds were selected for the applied analyses because 
of a common lack of information regarding economic values of environmental quality. While 
each watershed has a specific set of factors responsible for present environmental conditions 
both watersheds could benefit from information on the costs of past damages and benefits of 
future improvements. Environmental valuation and advanced econometric models provide a 
framework for valuing such costs and benefits. This dissertation provides economic 
information for environmental quality that can help landowners, non-landowners, 
stakeholders, and policy makers collectively work together to improve the state of the 
environment and progress toward environmental sustainability within the context of further 
economic growth and development. 
The three primary chapters in this dissertation are linked by a common objective of 
extending current environmental valuation techniques. The first chapter outlined necessary 
conditions for three separate economic agents to satisfy in order for a hypothetical forest 
amenity enhancement program to be realized. A representative contributor, third party non-
profit organization, and profit maximizing forest landowner comprised the three agents. A 
random utility behavioral model was selected for the analysis of necessary contributor 
" 
conditions, value maximization model with a budget balancing constraint for the third party, 
and a profit maximization model incorporating ecological capacity and environmental ethic 
for the landowner. The forest amenity enhancement program was described as a program 
administered by the third party and funded with individual contributions that supported private 
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landowners who undertook forest amenity improvement activities. Theoretical and 
mathematical analysis of agent behavior within the enhancement program showed such a 
program was possible as long as agents choose factor levels that optimized their respective 
constrained objective (i.e., utility, value or profit). This is a standard microeconomic result but 
further analysis of agent behavior revealed that even if they behave optimally the presence of 
free-riders in the economy will undermine program success. Furthermore, abstracting from the 
efficiency reducing effects of free-riding behavior, I presented two cases where the program 
may succeed but not provide the optimal level of amenities and one case of an inconsistent 
outcome (see Figure 1 ,  p. 47). This latter result derives from a disconnect (or information gap) 
between contributors representing demand and forest landowners that control the physical 
supply of forest amenities. It is this case that is of most interest for the success of the 
hypothetical forest amenity enhancement program and for evaluating the possibility of 
actually implementing a similar program in Tennessee. 
The second chapter extended the theoretical analysis using data on individual choices and 
willingness to pay for improved forest amenities solicited in a choice modeling based survey. 
The results of econometric analysis of these data revealed that people are willing to pay 
approximately $25 per year for 5 years for improved forest amenities (see Table 6, p. 87). 
However, the majority of forest landowners (representing amenity supply) are not in favor of 
undertaking management activities to improve the supply (see Tables 3 and 5, p. 76 and p. 
81).  Thus, the theoretical disconnect presented in the first chapter is empirically verified in the 
results of the second chapter. Collectively, these results suggest significant extension efforts 
may be necessary in order for a forest amenity enhancement program to be realized in 
Tennessee (more specifically, the Emory-Obed Watershed). These efforts should be focused 
on informing landowners of not only the public benefits of forest amenities but also possible 
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incentive-based schemes that would compensate landowners for amenity related management 
costs. Additionally, focused extension efforts would be able to inform forest managers and 
landowners of the types and levels of forest amenities the public prefers and how much they , 
would be willing to pay to secure improvements from the current state. Given increasing urban 
development pressures in our study area and in the South in general, alternative compensation 
options that would enable forest landowners to maintain their land in its natural state must be 
explored. Environmental valuation offers a legitimate and promising means for valuing and 
evaluating such options. 
In addition to complementing the theoretical analysis in the first chapter, data collected 
from the choice modeling survey were applied to an analysis of information effects in stated 
preference environmental valuation. A spatial information effect was defmed to be the 
influence on survey respondent preferences of forest land cover (m2) within a 1OOm radius of 
their residence. An aspatial information effect was defined to be the influence a researcher has 
on respondent preferences by simply altering the framing, or information content, of the 
survey. I altered the choice modeling survey by introducing an additional statement in one of 
the two survey versions informing respondents of the potential that 50 wooded acres in their 
area would be converted to a residential development. Results for the spatial information 
effects test reveal that spatial information affected choices but not stated willingness to pay 
(see Tables 4 and 6, p. 79 and p. 87; discussion on page 85). However, for the aspatial 
information effects test, differences in survey framing significantly affected both choices and 
" 
stated willingness to pay (Tables 4 and 6). Thus, respondent preferences and ultimately 
choices were influenced by both types of information but only one type changed willingness 
to pay. The significance of the aspatial information test for stated preference environmental 
valuation is that researchers could achieve a desired result by simply including information 
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they know will influence people to choose a certain way. The significance of the spatial 
information test is that to date no other published study has incorporated spatial land cover in 
a stated choice framework. 
Finally, the third chapter presented an innovative approach for valuing damages to 
forested wetlands using an implicit pricing model adapted from hedonic price theory and 
spatial econometrics. The basis for this study was research conducted during Summer 2002 
across 3 counties and 357 field plots in the Hatchie River Watershed, West Tennessee. 
Information from these field plots served as principal input in the implicit pricing model, 
which involved three stages. First, the aggregate market value of the forest at each field plot 
was determined by summing over the product of volume and market price by class (i.e., 
sawtimber or pulpwood). Next, site specific attributes known to affect the quantity of volume, 
species presence, and class distribution were measured at each plot and then incorporated in 
the econometric model. These attributes included both ecological, such as canopy closure, and 
anthropogenic factors, namely, channelization. In the third stage, the aggregate forest value 
was econometrically decomposed into the economic contribution of individual site attributes. 
Several functional forms of the implicit pricing model and underlying spatial dependence 
among unmeasured cross-site attributes were estimated in order to assess the reliability of the 
model and sensitivity to different assumptions. For all functional forms, though, a common 
nonparametric, first-order spatial autoregressive error model was specified. The double 
logarithmic representation of this model was found to provide the best fit and most defensible 
interpretation of estimated parameters (see Table 8, p. 1 15). Generalized moments estimation 
of the double logarithmic, first-order spatial autoregressive error model revealed significant 
impacts channelization and excessive sedimentation have had on the ecological productivity 
and market value of local forested wetlands (Table 8). Through first order differentiation of 
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the spatial econometric model, an economic value of -$2 18 per plot or -$5,438 ha-1 was 
imputed to these impacts (Table 9, p. 121). The significance of these results is three-fold. 
First, through the application of an environmental valuation technique economic values have 
been assigned to formerly unpriced negative externalities associated with channelization. 
Second, these values can be used to update present benefit cost analyses that involve 
channelization of streams in forest wetland systems or weight more appropriately the potential 
ecological damages associated with channelization in future analyses. Last, these results hold 
significance in justifying the economic benefits of restoring impacted streams and wetlands to 
their original condition (+$21 8  per plot or +$5,438 ha-1). 
Pooling the results of each study, the usefulness of environmental valuation for linking the 
economy and the environment through the development of prices is unambiguous. Moreover, 
these studies show the complicated theory and econometric analysis underlying environmental 






Definitions for Non-Timber Forest Benefits and Quality Levels Included in Choice Modeling 
Survey 
(1) Recreational Opportunities 
LOW: The landowner does not allow the non-paying public to hike, camp, fish, hunt or 
birdwatch (or simply, to recreate) on any portion of his/her land. 
MEDIUM: The landowner allows the public to recreate on some portion of his/her land. 
Additionally, only a certain type of recreation (for example, hunting or hiking) is allowed. 
HIGH: The landowner allows the public to recreate on all of his/her land and all the types of 
recreation listed above are allowed. 
(2) Stream Quality 
LOW: The landowner disturbs (by harvesting or road building, for example) almost all of the 
forest and natural vegetation found along streams and on steep hillsides. As a result, soil 
erosion is increased and the quality of the water for drinking, swimming, and fishing declines. 
MEDIUM: The landowner disturbs some of the forested and natural vegetation found along 
streams and on steep hillsides. Soil erosion still occurs, but not to the point found in LOW. 
HIGH: The landowner does not disturb any of the forested and natural vegetation found along 
streams and on steep hillsides. Additionally, the landowner plants trees and native plants along 
stream banks and hillsides to help slow soil erosion. 
(3) Scenic Beauty 
LOW: Very little open space among the trees, trees are crowded and smaller in size, and there 
are few plants on the ground. 
MEDIUM: Trees are more openly spaced and you can see into the forest. Trees are of 
moderate size and there are more plants on the ground than in the LOW level. 
HIGH: Trees are openly spaced, trees are large in size and there are many plants (both in type 
and quantity) on the ground. 
(4) Wildlife Habitat 
LOW: The landowner does not actively manage his/her land for improved wildlife habitat. 
MEDIUM: The landowner manages some of his/her land for native game or non-game 
animals. In order to do this, the landowner follows a management plan written by a wildlife 
resource professional. 
HIGH: The landowner manages all of his/her land for either native game or non-game species, 
or both. The landowner manages the land according to a management plan written by a 
wildlife resource pr�fessional. 
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APPENDIX B 
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for All Components of the Choice Modeling Survey in Part 3 
Status Quo Information No Development (n=l 045) Development (n=81 5) 
Mean No. Mean No. 
(Std. dev.) obs. {Std. dev.} obs. 
Demographic Variables 
Cumberland (Cumberland) 0.79 1045 0.70 8 1 5  
(0.4079) � (0.4588) 
Age 58.41 1 045 53 . 12  8 1 5  
(14.2681) ( 1 5.3227) 
Household size 2.33 1040 2.56 8 1 5  
(0.9553) ( 1 .0752) 
Length of residence 1 8.86 1 035 22.22 8 10  
(18 .9403) (20.7792) 
Level of education 3 .43 1 045 3 .20 8 1 5  
( 1 . 1 684) ( 1 . 1 738) 
Income 48903.01 1010  47 194.52 795 
(22778.8700) (24536.6500) 
Land Size (Land Size) 6.89 1 045 13 . 144 8 1 5  
( 16.0677) (23.0065) 
Male 0.75 1 045 0.67 8 1 5  
(0.4351)  (0.4710) 
Public and private forest participation 0.55 1 045 0.61 8 1 5  
(0.4980) (0.4886) 
Outdoor or environmental group or 0.16 1 040 0. 1 8  8 1 5  
organization member (0.3654) (0.3878) 
Attitudinal Variablei 
"Forests should be utilized in such a 0.94 1 045 0.95 8 1 5  
manner that they are in the same (0.2327) (0.2162) 
condition or better for future 
generations" 
"Forests should not be managed and 0.77 1035 0.82 805 
instead allowed to take the course of (0.4191)  (0.3845) 
nature" 
"Forests are important for wildlife, 0.97 1 035 0.98 8 10  
water quality, and landscape (0. 1 678) (0. 1349) 
appearance" 
"In your opinion, what is the primary 0.50 1 035 0.55 810 
threat to the future of Tennessee forests" (0.5001)  (0.4979) 
[Urban and commercial development = 
1 ;  Otherwise = 0] 
"How would you rate, on a scale of 0 to 2.78 1040 2.87 8 10  
5, your knowledge of forests and trees" ( 1 . 1 294) (1 .0958) 
(Knowledge) 
GIS Variable 
Forest Cover within l OOm buffer of 7.42 1045 7.69 8 1 5  
respondent [Forest Cover: sum of (6.8446) (7.2743) 
(COV8, 9, 10) /1000)] 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
Status Quo Information 
Survey Design Variables 
"Please rate the difficulty that you may 
have had in filling out this survey" [No 
difficulty = 1 ;  Some difficulty = OJ 
"Please rate the level of importance the 
Contribution Amount of each option 
played in your final decision" [Equal in 
importance to the nontimber forest 
benefits = 1 ;  No role in my decision = 
OJ 
"Please rate the level of confidence you 
have in the answers you have provided 
us" [Full confidence = 1 ;  
Some confidence = OJ 
Plan Score 
Contribution Amount 
No Development (n=1 045) Development ( n=8 1 5) 
Mean No. Mean No. 
(Std. dev.) obs. (Std. dev.) obs. 















3.34 1 045 3.65 
(1 .8737) (1 .8443) 
22.69 1 045 26.67 
(20.3687) (2 1 .03 70) 
805 
805 
8 1 0  
8 1 5  
8 1 5  
• Terms in parentheses denote variable names applied in econometric analysis of choices. Statistics based on actual 
choices made by participants. 
b Survey respondents were asked to select one of five possible choices for the first three attitudinal questions: 
strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. The five response format was condensed to a 
dichotomous agree or disagree variable; neutral responses are grouped with the strongly disagree and disagree 
choices. The results with neutral responses grouped in the agree category are similar to those presented and are 
available from the author. 
; 
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SAS Code for Designing Choice Model ing Ques t i onnaire 
( compl ements of Maj or Je f f  Smi th , Ph . D .  Candidate in Econ . , Univ . of 
Tenn . , Knoxvi l l e )  
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
* * 
* Thi s  program : * 
* - Provides an orthogonal combination of attributes and * 
* attribute qual i ty l evel s  for a choice model ing based * 
* questionnai re * 
* � * 
* ( Figure 2 )  * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
/ *Thi s  follows Tech Note TS- 6 7 7 E ,  part icularly the " Chai r  Exampl e " . * / 
%mktex ( 4  3 3 ,  n=3 * 3 * 4 )  
/ * Create an e f f ic i ent design from the full factorial . Thi s  coding 
means that I have three attributes , one with 4 l eve l s , and two wi th 3 
l eve l s . Here , n equal s  the full factorial . * / 
data f inal ( drop= i ) ; 
set des i gn end=eof ;  
retain f 1 - f 2  1 f3 0 ;  
output ; 
i f  eof then do ; 
array x [ 6 ]  x1 -x3 f 1 - f3 ; 




/ *Thi s  s t ep create s  the ful l  factorial candidate set with variables 
x1 through x3 , because I only have three attributes , and ass igns a 1 
in the f l ag column to leve l s  of attributes that can be in any opt ion 
( columns f 1 - f2 ) . The f inal observation is the s tatus quo , or bas e  
opt ion , and i t  i s  coded wi th a 1 in t h e  f 3  column . The observations 
with f lag codes f1 and f2 can be used for any a l ternative o f  the 
f irst two alternat ive s , whi l e  the f3 observation may only be the 
third opt ion ( the status quo ) . * / 
/ * Options =noprint in choiceff and mktblk suppress the output . The 
f inal mktlab wi l l  print the output of interes t . * / 
%choic e f f ( data= f inal , model=clas s ( x1 -x3 ) , nset s = 1 8 , maxiter= 1 0 0 , 
f l ags = f 1 - f 3 , beta= z ero ) ; 
/ * Thi s  set create s  the mos t  e f f i c i ent des i gn . Ns ets equal s  1 8  choice 
sets with the opt ions that vary and i t  adds in the s tatus quo option 
to each choice set . * / 
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Appendix C (continued) 
%rnktblock ( data=best , na lts=3 , nblocks=2 , factors=x1 -x3 ) 
*This opt ion blocks the design into two blocks with 3 a l ternatives 
and 9 choice sets . * / 
data key ; 
input payment endangered $ readines s  $ ;  
format payment dol larS . O ;  
datal ines ; 
0 Low High 
10 Medium Medium 
2 5  High Low 
5 0  
%rnkt lab ( data=blocked , key=key) 
/ *Thi s  opt ion ass igns labe l s  to each of my al ternat ives . * / 
proc print ; by block set ; run ; 




SAS Code for Con t ingency Tabl e Analysis of Choi ce Model ing Resul ts 







Thi s  program : 
-Conduct s  Cochran-Mante l -Haenszel Tests of condi t ional 
independence for i xjxk tables of matched pairs 







* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
/ * code for information e f fec t s , contro l l ing for county * /  
data two_cho ices ; 
set choices ; 
i f  choice ge 1 ;  
run ; 
opt ions l ine s i z e = 7 6  nodate nonumber ;  
proc freq data=two_choices ; 
table s  cnty_c l * type_dl * opt ion2_1 I chi sq cmh nocol nopct agree ; 
run ; 
/ * code for l andowner e f f ec t s : control l ing for county* / 
opt ions l ines i z e = 7 6  nodate nonumber ; 
proc f req data= two_choices ; 




LimDep Code for Es tima t ing Mul t inomia l  and Mixed Logi t Models 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
* * 
* Thi s  program : * 
* -Creates new variabl es * 
* -Est imates mixed logi t model s  wi th correl ated coe f f ici ents * 
* -Estimates marginal e f fects * 
* -Estimates coe f f i ci ent di stributions * 
* * 
* * 
* ( Tables 4 & 5 )  * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
CREATE J = Trn ( - 3 ,  0 )  
ASC1 = ( J= 1 ) ; ASC2 = ( J=2 ) ; ASC3 = ( J=3 ) 
B_C = ASC 1  + ASC2 
COV_A = ( CODE8A + CODE9A + CODE1 0A )  I 1 0 0 0  
COV_B = ( CODE8 B  + CODE9B + CODE 1 0 B )  I 1 0 0 0  
COVA_1 = COV_A + 1 
LNCOVA1 = LOG ( COVA_1 ) 
BC_1COVA = B_C * LNCOVA1 
BC_TYPE B_C * TYPE_D1 $ 
BC_LAND B_C * LAND_MED $ 
BC_COVA B_C * COV_A $ 
BC_COVB B_C * COV_B $ 
BC_KNOWLEDG = B_C * KNOWLEDG $ 
BC_CNTY = B_C * CNTY_C 1 $ 
BC_LO B_C * LAND2_ME $ 
Rej ec t ;  B_C = - 9 9 9  I LN_ATTRS = - 9 9 9  I BC_1COVA= - 9 9 9  I BC_TYPE= - 9 9 9  
BC_CNTY= - 9 9 9  I BC_LAND = - 9 9 9 1 BC_KNOWL= - 9 9 9  $ 
CALC ; Ran ( 3 4 5 6 9 ) $ 
NLOGIT Lhs = CHOICE 
Rhs = PAYMENT , B_C , LN_ATTRS , BC_1COVA , BC_TYPE , BC_CNTY , 
BC_LAND , BC_KNOWL 
Choices = C , B , A  
; Tlg = l . d- 1 0  
RPL 
; Fen = PAYMENT ( N ) , B_C ( N ) , LN_ATTRS ( N) , BC_1COVA ( N) , 
BC_TYPE ( N ) , BC_CNTY ( N ) , BC_LAND ( N ) , BC_KNOWL ( N )  
Ef fec t s : PAYMENT [ C , B ] I B_C [ C , B ] I LN_ATTRS [ C , B ] I 
BC_1COVA [ C , B ] I BC_TYPE [ C , B ]  I BC_CNTY [ C , B ]  I 
BC_LAND [ C , B ]  I BC_KNOWL [ C , B ] 
Cor 
Pds = 5 
Pts = 1 0 0 0  
Hal ton $ 
148 
Appendix E (continued) 
?Coe f f ic i ent Distributions 
calc ; cov_az - 0 . 2 5 0 7 7 / 2 . 6 8 5 5 2 ; 
l i s t ; x phi ( cov_az ) ;  
l i s t ; z 1 -x $ 
calc ; type 0 . 7 1 6 8 0 / 7 . 1 7 7 4 0 ; 
l i s t ; x = phi ( type ) ; 
l i s t ; z = 1 -x $ 
calc ; score = 0 . 5 7 3 1 7 / 0 . 9 1 3 5 6 ; 
l i s t ; x = phi ( score ) ; 
l i s t ; z = 1 -x $ 
calc ; pay = - 0 . 0 4 4 9 0 / 0 . 0 0 0 0 4 ; 
l i st ; x = phi ( pay ) ; 
l i st ; z = 1 -x $ 
calc ; asc = 4 . 2 5 2 0 2 / 1 2 . 7 6 3 6 6 ; 
l i s t ; x = phi ( asc ) ; 
l i s t ; z = 1 -x $ 
calc ; land - 0 . 0 0 4 8 4 / 0 . 2 9 2 1 2 ; 
l i s t ; x = phi ( land ) ; 
l is t ; z = 1 -x $ 
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Appendix F 
LimDep Code for Es tima ting WTP 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
* * 
* Thi s  program : * 
* -Est imates wi l l ing to pay * 
* -Estimates standard errors with the del ta method * 
* -Tests whether WTPs are di f ferent from each other * 
* -Estimates 9 5 %  confidence interva l s  * 
* * 
* ( Tabl e  6 )  * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  







( - b3 * 2 ) /b1 ; ?WTP Plan Score 0 to 2 
- ( b3 * 2 +b5 ) /b1 ; ?WTP PS 0 to 2 ,  DEVELP 0 t o  1 
(b4 * 7 . 5 3 6 - ( b3 * 2 +b4 * 7 . 1 5 9 ) ) /b 1 $  ? 5 % reduct ion in 
? fore s t  cover 
calc ; l i s t ; z calc = ( 4 1 . 4 9 9 3 0 8 9 9 - 2 5 . 5 3 3 5 1 5 0 7 ) / 3 . 5 8 4 9 2 1 1  ; 
? Tes t ing nul l  hypothe s i s  that $ 4 1 . 5 0 is dif ferent f rom $ 2 5 . 5 3 
pvalue 1 - Phi ( z  calc , 1 )  ; 
tablevlu = Ntb ( . 9 5�1 ) $ 
calc ; l i s t ; z calc = ( 5 7 . 4 2 4 6 3 9 8 5 - 4 1 . 4 9 9 3 0 8 9 9 ) / 6 . 7 0 6 6 2 6 4 ; 
? Te s t ing nul l hypothes i s  that $ 5 7 . 4 2 from MNL model i s  
?dif ferent f rom $ 4 1 . 5 0 M L  model 
pvalue 1 - Phi ( z  cal c , 1 )  
tablevlu = Ntb ( . 9 5�1 ) $ 
calc ; l i s t ; z_calc = ( 3 9 . 7 1 1 8 9 8 3 0 - 2 5 . 5 3 3 5 1 5 0 7 ) / 4 . 6 2 4 2 6 5 6 ; 
? Te s t ing nul l  hypothes i s  that $ 3 9 . 7 1 f rom MNL model i s  
?di f ferent from $ 2 5 . 5 3 ML mode l 
calc ; l i s t ; 
pvalue 1 - Phi ( z  cal c , 1 )  
t ablevlu = Ntb ( . 9 5�1 ) $ 
conf iu1 
conf i l 1  
conf iu2 
conf i l 2  = 
conf iu3 ;= 
conf i l 3  = 
2 5 . 5 3 3 5 1 5 0 7 + ( 2 . 6 4 4 8 5 3 6 * 2 . 6 8 6 3 0 5 9 )  
2 5 . 5 3 3 5 1 5 0 7 - ( 2 . 6 4 4 8 5 3 6 * 2 . 6 8 6 3 0 5 9 )  
4 1 . 4 9 9 3 0 8 9 9 + ( 2 . 6 4 4 8 5 3 6 * 3 . 5 8 4 9 2 1 1 )  
4 1 . 4 9 9 3 0 8 9 9 - ( 2 . 6 4 4 8 5 3 6 * 3 . 5 8 4 9 2 1 1 )  
2 7 . 6 3 9 2 9 6 1 0 + ( 2 . 6 4 4 8 5 3 6 * 2 . 6 9 6 0 0 9 3 ) 1 
2 7 . 6 3 9 2 9 6 1 0 - ( 2 . 6 4 4 8 5 3 6 * 2 . 6 9 6 0 0 9 3 ) $ 
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Appendix G 
Procedures for Es t ima t ing Spa t i a l  Aut oregressi ve Error Models in 
Spa ceStat 








Thi s  program : 
- Provides procedures for the genera l i z ed moments 
e s t imator of f i rs t -order spat ial autoregress ive 
econometric mode l s  








* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
NOTE : SpaceStat i s  a menu driven s o f tware , thus the f o l l owing i s  a 
rudimentary out l ine ( as opposed to speci f ic coding ) f or e s t imating 
spat ial econometric mode l s . 
STEPS : 
( 1 )  In ArcView , use the " Data" opt ion to convert the table 
component o f  the shapef i l e  to a SpaceStat f i l e  
( 2 )  In SpaceStat , select " Too l s " then " Di stance Weights "  then 
" Create Matrix " 
( 3 )  Next , select " Tool s "  then "Dis tance Weights "  then " Cont iguity 
Weight s "  or " Inverse Dis tance Weight s "  
( 4 )  Select " Regre s s "  then " C lassic Mode l "  then e i ther 
heteroskedasticity speci f icat ion 
( 5 )  Repeat Step ( 4 )  f or various spatial econometric mode l s  
1 5 1  
Appendix H 
Arcinfo AML for Bu ffering, In tersecting, and Condensing Land Cover 
In forma t i on 








Thi s  program : 
-Buf fers georeferenced points , intersects buf fers and 
underlying land cover coverage ( polygon ) , and then sums 
over a l l  land cover c l asses 








* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
&args cross 1_u - id 
& i f  [ nul l %cross1_u- id% ] &then &return­
Usage : &r do_it <cross 1_u - id> 
& i f  [ l ength %cro s s 1_u-id% ] eq 1 &then &s housetext O O %cross1_u- id% 
&else & i f  [ length %cross1_u- id% ] eq 2 &then &s housetext 
O % cross 1_u- id% 
&el s e  &s housetext %cross 1_u- id% 
&type %cross 1_u- id% %housetext% 
&s inpntcover cross 1_u 
&s inpntinfo cross 1_u 
&s inplycover clas s_uc 
&s outpntcover pnt%housetext% 
&s outbufcover buf %housetext% 
&s outintcover int %housetext% 
/ * &goto SKIP 
reselect %inpntcover% %outpntcover% point 
reselect % inpntinfo% - i d  eq %cross1_u- id% 
n 
n 
/ *  Below " borrowed " from buf fer wi zard 
/ *  Begin : Buf fer Wi tard 
/ *  Aml script crea ted with ArcToolBox for tool : Buf fer Wi zard 
/ *  Edit ing thi s f i le may make it unreadable to the ArcToolbox 
BUFFER %outpntcover% j unkO # # 1 0 5  # POINT 
BUFFER %outpntcover% xxxtempO # # 1 0 0  # POINT 
TABLES 







Appendix H (continued) 
QUIT 
RENAME xxxtemp O  %outbufcover% 
ADDITEM %outbufcover% . PAT %outbufcover% . PAT INS IDE 5 5 I 
ADDITEM %outbufcover% . PAT %outbufcover% . PAT cross1_u-id 3 3 I 
TABLES 
SELECT %outbufcover% . PAT 
CALCULATE INSIDE 0 
RESELECT INS IDEO 
CALCULATE INSIDE 
AS ELECT 
1 0 0  
1 0 0  
DROPITEM %outbufcover% . PAT INSIDEO 
DROPITEM %outbufcover% . PAT xxxtemp O #  
DROPITEM %outbufcover% . PAT xxxtemp O - ID 
RESELECT %outbufcover% - id ne 0 
calculate cros s 1_u - i d  
QUIT 
%cross 1_u-id% 
& i f  [ exists xxxtemp O  - cover] & then KILL xxxtempO ALL 
/ *  End : Buf fer Wi zard 
c l ip % inplycover% j unkO j unk1 
intersect j unk1 %outbufcover% %outintcover% 
& i f  [ exists j unkO -cove r ]  &then ki l l  j unkO a l l  
& i f  [ exists j unk1 -cover ]  &then ki l l  j unk1 a l l  
&label SKIP 
frequency %out intcover% . PAT %out intcover% . FRQ 
grid-code 
ins ide 





&do i = 1 &to 3 7 2  
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